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Telecommunications Privatization in Mexico
by Kevin R. Hanson
On December 20, 1990 the government of Mexico
sold it's majority holding in Telefonos de Mexico (Telmex),

modernization. The sale of Telmex represents the culmination of both of these transitions.

the nation's monopoly telephone company. A consortium of a
Mexican coalition, Grupo Carso, and telecom giants
Southwestern Bell and France Telcom paid a total of US$1.76

LIBERAL ECONOMIC TRANSITION

According to the theory of hegemonic stability,

billion for majority ownership and operating control, or 20,4

order is established by a single dominant power, or hegemon.

percent of preferred stock. The remaining 30.6 percent was

This hegemon imposes its economic and political vision on

sold in tranches to various groups, including employees, for

the world (Keohane 1984, 31; see also Gilpin, 1981). After

another US$4,4 billion. The total sale, to date, has amassed

World War II, the United States was the world hegemon.

over US$6 billion dollars for the Mexican treasury. This sale

Uncontested economically and politically, the U.S. set out to

is widely regarded as "one of the greatest success stories of

transform the world into a liberal/democratic reflection of

the privatization revolution" (Galal et al 1994, 417). As such,

itself The rise of the Soviet Union limited U.S. dominance

it merits closer examination. However, in order to understand

somewhat, but only in the sense of breadth; within its

what made this sale such a success, it is first necessary to

domain, the U.S. was still the hegemon.

examine the larger forces which brought it about.
The privatization revolution can be traced to the

Within the realm of political economy, Keohane
argues hegemony is based on economic dominance. He states

convergence of two global transitions which had significant

that "hegemonic powers must have control over raw materials,

impact on the developing world. The first transition is the

control over sources of capital, control over markets, and com-

larger economic and political transitions which have swept

petitive advantages in the production of highly valued goods"

the globe since the early 1980s. Some of these transitions

(Keohane 1984, 32). Since the mid 1960s, the US has had

have received a great deal of attention: the fall of the Berlin

less control over these four determinants of hegemonic power.

Wall, the reunification of Germany, and the collapse of the

As American dominance has lessened, so has its dominance of

Soviet Union, for example. Elements of this transition

the world. While Keohane goes on to argue (indeed it is the

receiving less attention, but which are no less significant,

central point of his book) that a hegemon is not necessary for

include the adoption of democracy and more liberal econom-

global stability; however, a hegemon's decline is inherently felt

ic policies in much of Southern Europe, Latin America, and

throughout its sphere of influence.

Asia. Howard Wiarda calls these transitions the "quiet revo-

Signs of declining hegemony can be seen as early as

lution" (1995, vii). Second, Petrazzini argues that "among

the mid- I 960s. Comparative advantage was the first area of

the public services and state industries that are being

dominance to decline. The economic climate solidified after

restructured in most developing nations, one has emerged as

World War II was "an economic arrangement that depended

the spearhead and show case of a broader reform program:

on a productivity pact among the welfare state, the corporate

the telecommunications sector" (1995, I). The privatiza-

sector, and labor unions in which production and productivity

tion of Telmex is the direct result of these larger transitions.

expanded to the benefit of all parties involved ....With a bal-

First, Mexico's experience with liberal economic and democ-

ance between expanding mass production and mass consump-

ratic transition led to the privatization of nationalized

tion, unemployment remained below 4 percent, and the gross

industries. Furthermore, the telecommunications industry

national product (GNP) grew at a rate of 5 percent annually"

experienced a parallel transition toward competition and

(Otero 1996, 4). A crisis of productivity emerged as other
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industrialized nations began to rival the levels of productivity

resource. This position of power allowed these creditors to

once achieved only in the United States.

exercise significant control over the terms of credit extension.

This challenge to American dominance in compara-

Judith Teichman makes this point when discussing the IMF's

tive advantage did not result in an initial change in U.S. com-

impact in Latin America. She argues that "when l Latin

mitment to liberal economic policies. However, when com-

America's J only resource was the IMF, the resultant reschedul-

bined with the oil crisis of 1973, this commitment began to

ings and new loans overseen by that organization entailed a

weaken. The oil crisis provides an excellent example of the

variety of economic policy conditions. These conditions,

decline of American dominance over raw materials. The well-

which reflected current economic thinking, strongly encour-

documented OPEC embargo placed, for the first time, serious

aged, if they did not dictate, policies conducive to economic

constraints on American access ro essential production materi-

liberalization" (1995,6). The goal of reducing state interven-

als. Dependence on foreign oil forced U.S. firms to pay dra-

tion and returning to a reliance on market forces brought

matically inflated rates, which in turn led to an increase in

pressure on indebted LDCs to privatize and deregulate

production costs. Because all other industrialized western

national industries.

nations were also affected, a period of intensified international

A widely held perception of inefficient nationalized

competition ensued. The United States, "strongly supportive

industries fueled the privatization movement. Teichman claims

of expanded trade relations prior to 1970, now became

that "the trade restricting import-substitution industrializa-

increasingly protectionist, and the liberal trading environment

tion policies .... were seen as responsible for the decline in

of the pre- 1 970 period began to wane" (Teichman 1995, 5).

economic activity in

The oil crisis had the additional effect of lessening

lLatin America 1 and,

it was argued,

should therefore be replaced by freer economic policies."

U.S. control over sources of capital. The dramatic increase in

(Teichman 1995, 7). As the magnitude of the crisis became

OPEC profits flooded the capital market with "petrodollars."

apparent during the mid- 1 980s, both IMF and World Bank

Commercial banks aggressively sought borrowers. Less devel-

policies reflected this belief Indeed, third world debtors were

oped countries (LDCs) were prime targets because they seek-

required to follow policies of state reduction and increased

ing to expand their economies through import substitution

reliance on the private sector.

industrialization models or to take advantage of inflated oil

As these policies were implemented, both agencies

prices by increasing their own production (Teichman 1995,

seemed to be initially pleased with the privatization of peripheral

6). Combined with increasing costs, additional debt became a

organizations, while allowing core companies to remain in state

burden too heavy for LDCs to bear when interest rates rose

hands. However, the Brady Plan, "announced by U.S. Treasury

dramatically in 1981. The increase in balance of payments

Secretary Nicolas Brady in March 1989, went considerably fur-

brought on the now infamous debt crisis of the 19 80s

ther, pledging to grant debt relief to countries that implemented

(Haggard and Kaufman 1995,285).

market-oriented reform to promote growth. Striking a deal

The decline of American hegemony during the

involved privatization of core sectors" (Teichman 1995, 8).

1 960s and 1 970s contributed to the transformation of the

Noted privatization expert Ramamurti attributes the aggressive

global economic environment in the 1980s. For Latin

drives toward privatization after 1989 in Argentina, Mexico, and

America, and most of the developing world, it also con-

Venezuela to the Brady Plan (1996,82).

tributed to a dramatic debt crisis. It is this crisis that ulti-

This dramatic change in economic emphasis can be

mately brought about the onset of their economic transforma-

attributed to diminished comparative advantage and the oil

tion. As LDC ability to repay commercial loans diminished

crisis of the 1970s and their impact on U.S. hegemony rela-

and many approached default, international institutions such

tive to Keohane's definition. While these are limited examples

as the IMF and the World Bank became the last available

of an extremely large phenomenon, they demonstrate the

6
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decline of American dominance and that the effects of the

times resulted in the destablization of many authoritarian

ensuing transformation were felt throughout the developing

regimes in Latin American, that were ultimately replaced by

world, particularly in Latin America. Furthermore, these exam-

more democratic governments.

ples demonstrate that the Latin American economic crisis of
the 1980s can be attributed to the decline in U.S. hegemony.

LIBERAL/DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN MEXICO

The liberal/democratic transition in Mexico is an
DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION

The Latin American economic crisis of the 1980s, in

important example of such revolutions. Although Mexico
shares many similarities with the overall liberal economic and

turn, lead to an equally dramatic political upheaval. Wiarda

political transition experienced throughout the developing

points out that there has been a miraculous transformation in

world, and especially within Latin America, its distinct politi-

Latin America. In 1977, fourteen of twenty countries in this

cal apparatus requires closer examination. Unlike many

hemisphere had authoritarian governments. As of 1995, nine-

nations in the region, Mexico was not under military, authori-

teen now have "more or less" democratic governments

tarian, or communist rule prior to the debt crisis of 1981.

(Wiarda 1995, vii). Haggard and Kaufman argue that both

Mexico has had democratic rule since its revolution in 1920;

political and economic causes must be examined simultane-

however, the dominance of the Institutional Revolutionary

ously (1995,4). In other words, a political economy of

Party (PRI) can only be described as "democratic-authoritari-

democratic transition must be established.

anism." Democratic institutions exist (IE political parties and

Haggard and Kaufman's argument of a political
economy of democratic transition is based on three key
premises: first, the socio-economic structure of a nation

elections) but are severely limited by PRI dominance (Otero
1996, 10; see also Teichman, 1995).
Such dominant party systems, while equally affected

directly impacts political alignments; second, the economic

by crises, respond differently. Haggard and Kaufman explain

performance of the political regime impacts satisfaction

that "the most distinctive feature of dominant-party regimes ..

among key support groups; and third, political/economic

.. is their political resiliency in the face of both economic

interests are inseparable from socio-political institutions.

downturns and periods of growth. Because they possess

This is crucial to understanding their argument that failure by

greater political resources for the management of political

the existing regime to react in a timely and adequate way to

conflict, they are more likely to persist through economic cri-

economic crises leads directly to the destablization, and ulti-

sis" (1995, 13). Two reasons why they are able to maintain

mately, the replacement of their government (Haggard and

power are, first, such a system provides the necessary indepen-

Kaufman 1995,6-7). Therefore, given the tumultuous nature

dence to initiate unpopular measures, and, second, it provides

of the economic crisis facing the developing world, it is not

means for building organized support mechanisms (Haggard

surprising that many of the governments in power suffered a

and Kaufman 1995,284). Due to the PRJ's ability to consol-

loss of support and were ultimately replaced.

idate power and organize support, it was not replaced as were

In summary, through the larger theories of Keohane
and Haggard and Kaufman, it can be seen that the political
economy of Latin America has been dramatically altered since

other Latin governments. However, significant economic and
political change resulted from this crisis.
Ironically, it is the nature of Mexico's dominant-party

the late 1960s. The decline in U.S. hegemony contributed to

system which exacerbated its economic crisis and resulted in

the changed economic environment and to an unsustainable

lost political power. A crisis of legitimacy surfaced with the

level of debt. The ensuing balance-of-payments crisis, in turn,

unusually brutal suppression of the Tlatleloco Square student

led to a broader economic crisis when coupled with dramatic

rebellion in Mexico City in 1968. The reconciliatory attempts

increases in interest rates in 1981. These difficult economic

of successive presidents Echeverria and Lopez Portillo ulti-
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mately led to a deepening of the impending economic crisis.

the U.S. and Canada, a step widely seen as both confirming

These successive presidents initiated, among other reactions,

and consolidating the enacted measures.

rural land reform, a dramatic increase in government spending

In spite of the successful reaction to economic crisis,

on health and education, nationalization of the banking indus-

there was some political fallout. In conformity with Haggard

try (1982), and a substantial increase in public investment and

and Kaufman's overriding theory of democratization, the PRI

in the size of the public enterprise sector (Haggard and

did suffer a considerable loss of political dominance. However,

Kaufman 1995,284; see also Teichman, 1995).

their dominant-party control did allow the government to

In an attempt to lessen reliance on external debt to

remain in office where there might otherwise have been a transi-

fund these programs, the PRI proposed tax reforms in the

tion similar to those seen throughout much of Latin America.

early 1970s. However, the powerful, rightist private sector

Perhaps the most visible demonstration of this decrease in

successfully blocked the effort, forcing the government to rely

power was the growth of opposition parties, especially the

on foreign borrowing and an inflation tax. Several scholars

National Action Party (PAN). For the first time since the revo-

have pointed out that "this road led directly to high deficits,

lution, a party other than the PRI won a governorship and was

inflation, and a balance-of-payments crisis in 1975 -76 .... by

allowed to take office (Haggard and Kaufman 1995, 302).

the end of the decade, the economy was highly vulnerable to

PAN won three governorships in rural states between 1988 and

the external shocks that hit all of the developing world: the

1992. Furthermore, Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, the son of the pop-

sharp rise in interest rates, the collapse of commercial lending,

ular president Lazaro Cardenas, waged a substantial challenge to

and for oil producers, the sharp fall of oil prices" (Haggard

the PRI candidate, Carlos Salinas de Gortari, in the 1988 presi-

and Kaufman 1995,285). External shocks did hit Mexico,

dential elections. Salinas won only 50.7 percent of the popular

and the PRI faced a significant economic and political crisis.

vote, the lowest total in PRI history (See Appendix 2), even

Three features of the dominant-party regime allowed
the PRI to react effectively to this crisis. First, flexibility associated with the powerful presidency allowed for strong, and

with the benefit of gross electoral fraud (Haggard and Kaufman
1995,302: Teichman 1995, 175).
This political crisis forced two reactions from the

timely, reaction. Second, the core of technocrats within the

PRI and Salinas. First, the creation of PRONASOL

Bank of Mexico and the Finance Ministry facilitated movement

(National Solidarity), an organization designed to link the

toward neo-liberal reform. Third, corporatist control over

government to the urban and rural poor. Local committees

unions allowed control of wage restraint, plant closing, and

were created which joined with regional representatives

privatization (Haggard and Kaufman 1995,286-7). These fac-

appointed by the president to create and fund local develop-

tors allowed the external debt to be rescheduled and thereby

ment projects. The goal was to offset some of the political

reduced nearly in half between 1982 and 1985 (See Appendix

pressure caused by the unequal distribution of wealth and

1). It also allowed President de la Madrid to normalize tense

resources throughout the nation. PRONASOL had the added

relations with the IMF in 1985 -6 and enter GATT negotia-

advantage of serving as a political counterweight to the old-

tions in 1987. The following year, trade liberalization contin-

guard politicians within the PRI who were not supportive of

ued to increase with the virtual elimination of quantitative

some of the reform measures (Haggard and Kaufman 1995,

restrictions and the dramatic reduction of the average tarifE As

300). Second, constitutional amendments were passed in

the de la Madrid presidency came to a close, the heavy inflation

1990 and 1993 which created new opportunities for opposi-

of the 1 980s was brought into check, reduced from highs of

tion parties to gain representatives in the legislature and at

160 percent in 1987 to under 30 percent in 1988 (Otero

state and local levels. These amendments reduced the ability

1996, 9). The crowning accomplishment of this recovery was

of the PRI to dominate and manipulate the electoral process,

the 1989 admission of Mexico into NAFTA negotiations with

a mainstay of its political control. Perhaps the most signifi-

8
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cant aspect of these amendments is that they were passed with
support of PAN (Haggard and Kaufman 1995, 300).
Political changes clearly took place in Mexico as a

Building on the success of these larger sales, the
government undertook a more ambitious second stage of privatization during 1985 and 1986. While the pace of divesti-

result of the economic crisis in the developing world. The

ture was increased, the policy of affecting only non-core

after shocks of the American decline were felt strongly from

industries remained in place. Over eighty-two companies were

the mid 1970s until the late 19805. However, the nature of

either sold, liquidated, or transferred. These companies were

the Mexico's dominant-party democracy provided a resiliency

in non-core areas of domestic products such as paper, cement,

that mitigated the type of political transition seen in other

auto parts, secondary petrochemicals industries, electro-

Latin American nations.

mechanical products, and mining metallurgy. By the end of the
de la Madrid administration in 1986, 706 companies had

PRIVATIZATION IN MEXICO

In spite of the resiliency of Mexico's dominant-party
democracy in the face of economic and political crisis, there
were significant changes in long-held policies. One of the

been divested (Teichman 1995, 1 35). Furthermore, this stage
of privatization demonstrated a serious, long-term commitment to liberal economic reform.
The third and fourth stages of privatization, however,

most scrutinized policies was the prevalence of nationalized

marked an ambitious divergence from the previous two. Stages

industries. As a debtor nation reliant on international credit

one and two were politically cautious, always careful to avoid an

institutions, Mexico came under increasing pressure to priva-

industry or company that might be sensitive to national pride,

tize their huge number of state-owned companies (Waterbury

union dominance, or public services. Beginning in stage three,

1990, 31 3) (See Appendix 3).

these more sensitive firms were longer avoided. The opening of

Movement toward privatization began in 1982 under

this stage was marked by the 1986 closure of Fundidora

President de la Madrid. While there was considerable resis-

Monterrey, the nation's largest steel mill. This era ended in late

tance from many sectors of both state enterprises and govern-

J 989 with the decision of the Salinas administration to priva-

ment. the pace of divestiture increased as government control

tize all state enterprises in areas not specifically mentioned in

was consolidated under the successive presidencies of de la

the constitution as 'strategic' (Teichman 1995, 13 2).

Madrid and Salinas. Part of the necessary political consolida-

With the continued political consolidation of the

tion was achieved by a prudent approach to divestiture. Due

Salinas administration, the fourth stage took on the most dif-

to the delicate nature of privatization, only non-core indus-

ficult battles. In late 1989, "the economic cabinet agreed to

tries were initially sold, closed, or reorganized. President de la

divest of all public enterprises in sectors not specifically

Madrid announced in early 1982 "that while state ownership

named in the Constitution .... That is, the state would Ionly 1

was 'under review,' the state would withdraw only from 'small

retain PEMEX (petroleum), CFE (electrical energy), FER-

and medium enterprises Iwith 1scarce influence' on the behav-

RONALES (railways), and the Central Bank, along with agen-

ior of productive branches" (Teichman 1995, 131). In this

cies involved in mail delivery, radio telegraph, and communica-

first phase of privatization, the pace was slow and methodical.

tions via satellite" (Teichman 1989, J 36). The first and

However in 1983 and 1984, the pace quickened. Over one

largest victory in the fourth stage was the sale of the national

hundred state companies were shed. The companies sold were

telephone company, Telmex (Galal et al. 1994,4 I 7).

rarely of a nature that would cause public discomfort. Paper

The privatization of Telmex was the crowning

companies and food processing firms, for example, were sold

accomplishment of the economic and political transitions that

without widespread consternation. The most important sales

swept Mexico. It was not undertaken quickly or without prece-

during this phase were of the automotive companies Renault

dent. Rather, this $6.2 billion sale represents a serious com-

of Mexico and Vehiculos Automotores Mexicanos.

mitment to liberal economic poliCles. The transition from a
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closed- to an open-market economy did not come quickly or

users is that CCMs traditionally keep local usage prices low,

easily. The decline of the United States economic hegemony

mostly for political reasons; unfortunately, this in not the case

created a sever crisis that caused both political and economic

with long-distance or international rates.

realignment. It is this realignment that brought about the policy of privatization and that led to the sale of Telmex.

Politics is involved on another level in the Cash
Cow Model. The CCM's "most striking characteristic is that
service suppliers are not allowed to retain and reinvest the

THEORY OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS PRIVATIZATION

Like the world of political economy, the world of

bulk of their profits. The national treasury views telecommunications as a cash cow that is milked for funds to invest

telecommunications underwent a dramatic transformation. Just

elsewhere" (Cowhey and Aronson 1989, 8; see also

as the developing world was forced to reexamine its commit-

Straubhaar, 1995). Ramamurti states that in Mexico, the

ment to nationalized industries, so to was the telecom arrange-

government received up to 42 percent of annual profits dur-

ment in most LDCs brought under scrutiny by the changed

ing the 1980s (1996,73). Many developing countries see

global climate. Therefore, in order to understand the impor-

this advantage and rely heavily on the Cash Cow Model.

tance of the Telmex privatization, some exposure to the theoret-

However, the pressures of this dynamic industry make a

ical premises of telecommunications privatization is necessary.

CCM difficult to maintain over time. These pressures push

Peter Cowhey is perhaps the leading scholar on te/ecom in Latin America. He argues that there are six basic models of telecommunications organization: Scarcity, Cash Cow,

LDCs to consider Cowhey's next level of organization, the
Monopoly Modernization Model (MMM).
As the name suggests, an MMM is not an attempt to

Monopoly Modernization, Boutique, Full Competition, and

privatize, or dramatically change, the existing system. Rather

Global Communications. Each is characterized by respectively

it is an attempt to modernize the state-dominated system in

declining levels of government involvement coupled with

such a way as to promote additional services, provide uniform

increasing market control and private ownership (Cowhey and

technologies, and encourage national development. A key

Aronson 1989, 36). Cash Cow, Monopoly Modernization,

ingredient is an emphasis on national development through

and Boutique models will be examined as they are most applic-

telecommunications. Eventually, "governments and their lead-

able to this discussion.

ers come to view telecommunications more as a means to pro-

Until 1990, Mexico operated under a Cash Cow

mote development and modernization lmore so 1 than as a

Model (CCM). In a CCM, the government owns and operates

captive cash cow.... Countries shifting toward MMM recog-

the entire, or the vast majority, of the telecommunications

nize that communications services are far too important to

system. Domestic and international services are often separat-

permit the old system to continue" (Cowhey and Aronson

ed into distinct companies, each owned by the state. Services

1989, 1 I). Like the CCM, the MMM has a natural life span.

are usually limited. Beyond favoring elite industries, govern-

Monopolies cannot keep pace in a competitive global market

ment, and the military, urban customers are given priority over

place over time.

rural or remote users. The rational given is basic economics;

Once again, pressure pushes the developing nation to

extending lines to rural and remote locations requires large

the next level of organization: the Boutique Model (BM). The

capital outlays with proportionally little return. Whereas,

underlying premise of this model is that as telecom services

expanding urban services requires significantly less overhead

become increasingly specialized, increasingly specialized

with a comparably tremendous return via economies of scale.

providers are required. The main difference between Monopoly

Therefore, "to the extent that it is politically feasible, most

Modernization and the Boutique Model is the presumption of

carriers try to reallocate their investments to more profitable

competition. In an MMM, the existence of competition is a

lsectors r

bargained exception to the normal operation of the system. In

(Cowhey and Aronson 1989, 8). One advantage to

10
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a BM environment, "the issue is not whether there should be
competition, but how much and in which market segments"

TELECOMMUNICATIONS PRIVATIZATION IN MEXICO

As part of the fourth stage of privatization under

(Cowhey and Aronson ]989, 15). Furthermore, competition is

Presidents de la Madrid and Salinas, it was announced in

viewed within the BM as a vehicle to promote innovation and

September of ] 989 that Telmex would be sold. Telmex had

modernization. The injection of competitors and market forces

been the monopoly supplier of all telecommunications in

is intended to transform telecom companies into efficient

Mexico since its establishment in 1948. It was created from a

competitors able to adapt to customer and industry demands.

merger of two existing companies, both foreign owned:

Competition is seen as a means of transforming suppliers into

Telefonos Ericsson, a subsidiary of L.M. Ericsson of Sweden,

efficient entities. Unfortunately,

and Compania Telefonica Meixicana, a subsidiary of ITT of

"J

government cannot guaran-

tee success simply by instructing the monopoly telephone com-

the United States. The Mexican government became the

pany to change its ways. Transforming the dominant telephone

majority shareholder of Telmex in ] 958, and gained control of

company [requires 1 greater competition" (Cowhey and

51 percent of corporate equity in 1972, thereby assuming

Aronson 1989, 15).

control of the company and nationalizing it. The remaining

Foreign corporations are generally the principle

49 percent remained in private control and continued to trade

source of competition. Foreign expertise, experience, and

on both the Mexican stock exchange and the NASDAQ net-

money are integral parts of the Boutique Model. Indeed, often

work (Perez de Mendoza 1989,91).

when desired services are not available through domestic

Given the preceding discussion, it may seem obvious

providers, foreign firms are relied upon to fill the gap.

why Telmex would be privatized. However, Ramamurti argues

(Cowhey and Aronson 1989, 36). Perhaps the greatest asset

that it may not have been a natural target for the government

of a BM over the previous two models is a greater prevalence

auction block. By Latin American standards, Telmex was one

of investment funds. A BM encourages telecoms to reinvest

of the most productive, well run telecoms. Because of private

profits in the expansion of the national and international net-

roots and continued partial private ownership, it had a tradi-

work of services. Competition demands that all companies

tion of business-like behavior and strong accountability to

involved reinvest or suffer the consequences of becoming

share-holders. During the period of state ownership, "Telmex

un competitive (Cowhey and Aronson] 989, 36; Straubhaar,

was always profitable and always paid dividends. From 1985

1995). A last important note on the boutique model is that

to 1989, return on sales averaged 23.6 percent and return on

there are several distinct levels of competition before reaching

equity 12.8 percent. The government's pricing policies were,

an environment of full competition. The extent to which the

in fact, designed to yield a 12 percent return on capital"

state is involved in local and long-distance telephone service

(Ramamurti 1996, 75). Also, as mentioned above, it supplied

can range from limited private ownership of the state-domi-

substantial revenues to the national treasury. Therefore, it is

nated provider to complete privatization. The entire range

not unreasonable to ask, why privatize?

falls under this model. This model is as far as most LDCs will

The reasons for privatization are many. First, Telmex

go in the foreseeable future, therefore the Full Competition

suffered from the inherent ills of the Cash Cow Model. Profits

and Global Competition models will not be discussed.

were not reinvested and expansion was weak. Although Mexico

The ground work is now complete. Macro issues of

had comparable service to both Korea and Spain in ] 965, these

global and Mexican liberal/democratic transition, privatization

nations have experienced considerable expansion to roughly 30

in Mexico, and the theory behind telecommunications privati-

lines per 100 people. Mexico, on the other hand, has floun-

zation have all been discussed. These discussions provide the

dered by comparison and remains at under 10 lines per 100

foundation necessary to more fully understand the privatiza-

people. In ] 989, eighteen of the thirty countries in the

tion of telecommunications in Mexico.

Western Hemisphere provided more telephone access to its cit-
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izens than Mexico (see Appendix 4). Customers traditionally

far lower than the standard of 12 percent set for the 1990s.

waited several years for telephone installation. In fact, by 1989

By 1989, "more than half the telephone tax was diverted to

over one million people were on waiting lists for service

the treasury for general expenses, so that telephone users were

(Szekely 1995, 41). Therefore, the government" argued that

financing government programs in other sectors" (Ramamurti

privatization would enable Telmex to expand faster while mod-

1996,75). It was hoped that the separation of direct govern-

ernizing its network and services" (Ramamurti 1996,78).

ment control coupled with the threat of forthcoming competi-

In an effort to show that they were serious about
improving service and expanding the network, two days after
announcing the privatization, the Secretariat of

tion would provide necessary incentive to redirect profits to
expansion and modernization.
Another strong reason to sell Telmex was the desire

Communications and Transport announced that the future

of the Salinas administration to reduce budget deficits, and

owners would be required to meet the following ambitious

maintain those levels once realized (see Appendix 1).

standards:

Privatizing Telmex helped to achieve both goals. First, to
maintain the stated goal of network expansion at a yearly pace

•

the number of lines in service were to be expanded at a

of 12 percent would require an outlay of U.S.$2-2.5 billion~

minimum rate of 12 percent per annum until 1994; by

annually. The government did not feel that it could finance

2000, telephone density was to increase to ten lines per

this level of investment, neither did it feel that the company

100 population, compared to five lines per 100 popula-

could raise those funds internally or through its own credit

tion in 1989.

(Ramamurti 1996, 78). Conveniently, one of the principle
goals of most privatization is to raise funds for the national

•

all towns with a population of 500 or more were to have

treasury (Straubhaar 1995,19). Mexico saw a significant

telephone service by the end of 1994.

opportunity to do Just that, with the additional advantage of
not increasing its debt. When Telmex was sold in December of

•

the number of public telephones was to be increased from

1990, it fetched U.S.$ 1.76 billion for the treasury alone. The

0.8 per 1,000 persons to 2 per 1,000 persons in 1994

combined revenues from the prevIous 723 privatizations only

and 5 per 1,000 in 1998.

raised U.S.$47 1.2 million. In other words, in only the initial
offering, Telmex alone raised nearly four times the revenue of

•

in towns with automatic exchanges, waiting time for a
new connection was to be six months by 1995 and one
month by 2000.

all other privatization efforts (Ramamurti 1996, 72).

It would seem, then, that the decision to privatize
was a sound one. As the privatization went forward, several
ideas which conform with Haggard and Kaufman's model of

•

the quality of service to be improved as stipulated (see

the political economy of democratic transition came into play.

Appendix 6) (Szekely 1995, 50; see also Ramamurti,

The first such idea is the consolidation of presidential power.

1996).

As the privatization effort became entrenched during the
1980s, ideology came to playa significant role. With the

Meeting these standards was a requirement to maintaining

appointment of pro-liberal-transition technocrats in strategic

monopoly status.

positions under the successive presidencies of de la Madrid

A second reason to privatize is that as a typical

and Salinas, the move in many ways became inevitable. Salinas

CCM, political pressures kept Telmex from reinvesting its

was adamant that "Mexico had to transform itself from an

profits. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, reinvestment levels

inward-looking, state-dominated, protected economy to an

only allowed for an annual network expansion of six percent,

outward-looking, privatized, open economy that would take
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advantage of its location next to a large, rich neighbor"

allowed up to 49 percent of a telephone service company to be

(Ramamurti 1996, 77).

owned by foreigners, and Salinas chose not to change that. All

Haggard and Kaufman were adamant that presiden-

that was necessary was to amend the stipulation in Telmex's

tial power alone was insufficient to make the changes neces-

articles of association that at least 51 percent of the compa-

sary to maintain power in times of crisis. It was essential that

ny's stock had to be owned by the state" (Ramamurti 1996,

those who benefited from the existing system be appeased.

81). The necessary changes were made at a meeting of share-

One of the principle beneficiaries under the government's

holders and constitutional wrangling was avoided.

administration of Telmex was labor. Unions naturally fear pri-

With political obstacles overcome through the

vatization because of the possibility of dramatic losses of

strength of the presidency, Telmex was sold in December of

Jobs, sharp decline in pay scales, and loss of influence. Telmex

1990 to Grupo Carso, a Mexican business consortium operat-

employees were among the best paid in the nation and their

ing in conjunction with Southwestern Bell and France TeIcom.

work force had consistently expanded by eight percent during

Galal argues that the sophistication with which this sale was

the 1980s. The Telephone Worker's Union (STRM) was very

made makes it the model for other developing countries

involved in the internal workings of the company, and exerted

(1994, 417). Therefore, a pertinent public policy question is,

a great deal of influence on decisions. Furthermore, they rec-

why was this sale so successful?

ognized that a change in ownership could destroy this rela-

Perhaps the deciding factor in the sale's success was

tionship (Ramamurti, 1996). The key in winning STRM

the care which the Mexican government took to assure that

cooperation was presidentIal power. Salinas became personally

quality investors would be attracted. Telmex "was reasonably

involved, and secured support through a "carrot-and-stick

attractive to begin with. It was fairly well run and profitable.

offer." The agreement consisted of three main points: first, a

Its future promised real growth of 12 percent per year for at

promise that no jobs would be lost once ownership changed

least five more years. It had one million people on the waiting

hands; second, employees would be allowed to buy a substan-

list for new connections. Demand for long-distance service

tial amount of shares with the support of a government-

was booming as the Mexican economy began to open up and

backed loan; third, the privatization would happen even with-

trade with the United States expanded" (Ramamurti 1996,

out their cooperation (Ramamurti 1996, 79-80). The first

83). This alone would seem to make Telmex an attractive

two concessions are not uncommon. The threat of overwhelm-

prospect; nonetheless, the government took several actions

ing the union is a direct reflection of the type of presidential

which would assure a quality transaction.

authority which makes a dominant-party system more resilient
to political transition.
Another key constituency which had to be appeased

One of the most important actions taken prior to
the sale was to rebalance local and international tariffs.
Remember that Cowhey and Aronson argue that a common

was the legislature. While in Mexico's dominant-party system

feature of a CCM is unrealistically low prices for local services

the legislature does not wield a great deal of power, it have

(1989,8). This is done by offsetting the expense through

enough to be disruptive. Therefore, the conditions of the sale

inflated international prices and is motivated by political con-

were maintained within the parameters of the Constitution.

cerns. Until 1987, Mexico had been a fairly typical example of

Telephone service is not specifically reserved to the state

a CCM, and it was reflected in pricing schemes. In 1988 local

under the Constitution as are petroleum, railroads, and bank-

service tariffs were raised "sharply." Telmex profits increased

ing. Two specific telecommunications functions are reserved to

from U.S.$206 million in 1987 to U.S.$628 million and

the state: satellites and telegraphs. Rather than get into a dif-

U.S.$450 million in 1988 and 1989 respectively. The second

ficult constitutional struggle with the legislature, Salinas

part of the rebalancing was to reduce international rates, also

opted to retain these two services. Furthermore, "the rules

done in 1988.
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By raising rates for the part of the business that was

would delay, or even eliminate, the opening of the long-dis-

a natural monopoly (that is, local service), the gov-

tance market, especially considering the tremendous success

ernment enhanced Telmex's ability to respond to

already experienced (Dolan 1995, 12 I). However, the

competition .... in long distance service. The price of

announcement in 1994 that competition would indeed be

Telmex shares rose more steeply in the Mexican stock

allowed as planned solidified the transition to a BM. Since the

exchange in response to the tariff revision than it did

1994 announcement, eight companies have registered to enter

either when privatization was announced by Salinas

the long-distance market, collectively pledging to invest

or after control of the firm actually turned over to

U.S.55 billion by 2002 (Peterson 1996, Cl).

the new owners (Ramamurti 1996, 84).

Telmex has taken the threat of competition very seriously. Since the new ownership took control in 1990, they

This was crucial in creating a viable environment for both

have spent "over [U.S.S1 10 billion on plants and equipment,

Tclmex and its future owners, as demonstrated by the reaction

adding over 3 million new lines, digitizing 2.4 million analog

of the business world. But it was also politically crucial

lines, laying 8,400 miles of fiber-optic cable, and co-leading

because it removed a daunting task that would have been left

construction of a trans-Atlantic fiber-optic cable" (Dolan

to the incoming private firm. While this resulted in substan-

1995,121). In fact, most of the standards set by the privati-

tial short- and long-term profits for Telmex (arguably the

zation agreement have been either met or exceeded (see

largest gain in the entire process), it was perhaps more impor-

Appendices 5 and 6). In short, the goals of the privatization

tant in that it effectively removed the government from direct

have been met to date, and there is little reason to disagree

control of company earnings. This further reduced the Cash

with the authors who have labeled the Telmex sale the stan-

Cow Model environment and facilitated a movement toward a

dard for all other nations to chase (Galal et al. 1994,417).

Monopoly Modernization Model.
This movement was written into the privatization
agreement as another effort to make the company more attrac-

CONCLUSION

The privatization of Te1mex is a direct result of larg-

tive to investors; however, it was granted as a temporary peri-

er liberal economic and democratic transitions as experienced

od to allow for the consolidation of Telmex. Continued

in Mexico. Furthermore, when combined with the transition

monopoly power was granted until 1997. In January of that

within the telecommunications industry toward private owner-

year, Mexico was scheduled to move into the Boutique Model

ship and modernization, it is evident that this sale is the

by opening long-distance and international calls to complete

result of converging transitions. The decline of u.S. hegemo-

competition. An important difference between Mexico's tran-

ny and the ensuing debt crisis in Latin America forced the

sition to a BM compared to other developing countries is that

Mexican government to reevaluate its commitment to a closed

Telmex was not broken into competing entities. In Argentina

market and nationalized industries. Economic crisis also

local service was separated into two national companies, divid-

caused a political realignment. While the government was not

ed geographically between the north and south. In Chile local

replaced, as was the case in much of Latin America, presiden-

and long-distance services were broken into distinct compa-

tial power was consolidated and rival political parties were

nies. Telmex was allowed to remain intact in an effort to

given more accommodation. These transitions led to a dra-

attract investors (Ramamurti 1996, 85).

matic sell-off of nationalized industries. The crowning accom-

Transition into the Boutique Model has important
considerations beyond the immediate infusion of competition.
There was some doubt about the government's commitment
to allow competition. Many feared that political pressure

plishment of this process was the US$ 6 billion sale of the
national telephone company.
This huge sale also represents the parallel transition
within the tdeeom industry. Beyond the pressures of global
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economics and national politics, the telecom industry has taken

deeper considerations. For example, with the exponentially

on increased importance in a nation's economic development.

expanding information revolution. the privatization of Telmex

Mexico could no longer afford itself the luxury of siphoning

will impact the average Mexican citizen in ways that we cannot

Telmex profits to fund more politically expedient projects. The

yet imagine. Perhaps the introduction of a privately owned,

pressures of the information era demand reinvestment of prof-

internationally competitive telecommunications company into

its and expansion of communication networks. Wisely, the

a more democratic and market oriented Mexico will prove to

Mexican government recognized the ability of the Telmex sale

be the key to long-term, substantial social and economic

to satisfy the pressures of both converging transitions.

development. Given the information era we now live in,

The convergence of these transitions is important

stranger things have happened.

within the realm of political economy; however, there are also

-APPENDIX 1 SELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS

MExIco 1982-1992
Indicators
% Change in real GOP
Inflation
Change in real min. wage
Investment growth
Trade balance ($US Bil)
Federal deficits/GOP
FDI ($US Bil)
External debt/GOP

'82
-0.6
58.9
-12.6
-16.8
7
16.9
1.7
49.1

'83
-4.2
101.8
-20.1
-26.6
14.1
8.6
0.5
61

'84
3.6
65.5
-1.6
4.3
13.2
8.5
0.4

54.2

'85
2.6
57.7
-5.9
7.9
8.4
9.6
0.5
52.6

'86

'87

-3.8
86.2
-2.9
-II.8

1.7
131.8
-3.8
-0.1
8.8
15
3.2
73.6

5
14.9
1.5
76.6

'88
1.2
114.2
-15.7
5.8
2.6
10.9
2.6
59.1

Source: Teichman. 1995. Privatization and political change in Mexico. 70.
Haggard and Kaufman. 1995. The political economy of democratic transitions, 289.

-APPENDIX 2 PRJ ELECTION RESULTS, 1970-1994

Year

Candidate

Vote Share

1970
1976
1982
1988
1994

Luis Echeverria Alvarez
Jose Lopez Portillo
Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado
Carlos Salinas de Gortari
Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon

86
100
74.3
50.7
50.2

Source:

Haggard and Kaufman. 1995. The political economy of democratic transitions. 302

'89

'90

3.3
20
6.1
6.4
0.4
5
3
48.6

4.4
26.7
-8.9
13.1
-0.9
2.8
2.6
39.8

'91
3.6
22.7
-4.7
8.1
-7.2
0.3
4.8
36.4

'92
2.8
15.5
-4.6
10.8
-15.9
-1.6
4.3
33.4
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-APPENDIX 3-

CREATION AND DIVESTITIJRE OF PUBUC ENTERPRISES

MEXICO, 1983-1993

Divestitures
Completed

Divestitures
In Progress

Divestitures
Authorized

No. of
Companies
Created

No. of
Companies
in Existence at
Year's End

"

1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
Source:

107

32
7
23
75
49
89
170
190
87
53

75
32
89
132
86
76
69
82
95
66
1.5

10
18

39
112
207
135
165
239
272

7
7
15
2
2
2

-

-

1058
1037
932
732
612

-

5
8

-

4

449
386
286
241
217
209

Teichman, 1995. The Politics of Priw1tization in Mexico, 13 1.

-APPENDIX 4Telephone Lines per 100 Residents
Western Hemisphere, 1990
Canada
United States
Barbados
Bahamas
Granada
Trinidad & Tobago
Argentina
Costa Rica
Belize
Panama
Suriname
San Vicente
Venezuela
Columbia
Chile
Mexico
Jamaica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador

Cuba~===r---t--~r---t---;---;----r---t--~r---t---t-~

Peru
Paraguay
Bolivia
EI Salvador
Guatemala
Guyana
Honduras
Nicaragua
Haiti

-I
-I
-I
-I

I
I

-p
-p
-p
-~

o

10

20

30

40

50

Source: Szekely and del Palacio, 1995. Ttlifonos de Mexico, 42.

60

115
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-APPENDIX 5-

TELMEX PERFORMANCE VS. SELECT NATIONS

1988-1993
Main
lines/
Per 100
people

Employee
/1,000
mam
lines

Waiting
time for
line
(years)

Main
lines with
failure

Mexico

5.2

10

Argentina

9.6

Brazil

Local call

Long-distance
completion
rate (%)

Days to
repatr a
line

Dial tone in
3 seconds

(%)

completion
rate (%)

2-3

10

92

90

4

97

14

22

45

42

29

14

na

5.5

II

na

5

39

na

2

84

Chile

4.6

8

na -

7

97

93

3

95

Venezuela

7.5

II

8

na

49

31

na

na

Tanzania

0.2

69

II

na

na

na

na

na

India

0.5

96

na

13

na

na

na

na

Indonesia

0.4

50

8

17

na

na

na

na

United States

51

6.6

A few days

>1

na

na

na

na

Japan

40

6.6

A few days

>1

na

na

na

na

Country

Source: Ramamurti. 1996. Telephone privatization in a large country: Mexico, 90.

(%)
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-APPENDIX 6TELMEX PERFORMANCE,

1988-93

"-

Performance Indicator

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

Lines in Service
Annual increase (k' s)

288

460

508

670

729

867

% Increase

7

10.5

10.5

12.5

12.1

12.8

Total lines (k' s)

4,387.0

4,847.0

5,355.0

6,025.0

6,754.0

7,621.0

Lines installed
Annual increase (k' s)

345

535

705

759

711

975

% Increase

7.4

10.4

12.4

11.9

9.9

12.4

Total lines (k' s)

5,152

5,687

6,392

7,151

7,862

8,837

Telephone density (per/lOO)

5.6

6.1

6.6

7.2

8

8.7

# Employees

49,995

49,203

49,912

49,488

48 ,937

48,771

Lines per employee

85.5

95.2

104.2

117.7

133 .3

151.5

Capital expenditure ($USm)

1,080.0

987.0

1,831.0

1,967.0

2,352.0

2,282.0

Source: Ramamurti. 1996. Privatization in a large country: Mexico, 90.
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The Logic of Declining Civic Participation
by Jason
In recent years scholars have focused increasing
attention on the role played by free or voluntary associations

William Beutler
A DEFlr--:ITION

or

FREE ASSOCIATIOl':

Alexis de Tocqueville's explanation of free associa-

in American society. Some of the research done on this sub-

tions remains a highly respected account of how and why

ject suggests that one form of free association, the civic asso-

these groups form in a democratic society. For this reason

ciation, is a key source of social capital: a set of norms and

many scholars return to Tocqueville to begin their discussion

shared ideals that produce a network of trust many consider

of almost any type of voluntary association (Hall 1995, 5).

essential for the success of democratic liberal society.

According to Tocqueville, free associations can be organized

Consequently, some scholars argue that civic organizations

for any conceivable purpose, but they all have one thing in

such as the Boy Scouts, bowling leagues, and the Red Cross

common: they unite "the energies of divergent minds and vig-

are an essential part of American life. However, another type

orously [direct 1them toward a clearly indicated goal" (1966,

of free association typically known as the interest group, is

190). This characteristic of free associations is apparent in

often accused of thwarting the public good in pursuit of its

both civic associations and interest groups. Both groups orga-

own, narrow interests. These interest groups have proved so

nize to purse some chosen end. Thus both interest groups

destructive that one writer has accused them of being "the

and civic associations fit the definition of a free association

silent killer of American government" (Rauch 1994, I).

given by Tocqueville.

Given the positive effects of civic associations and the prob-

The term free association itself points out one of

lems caused by interest groups, one would hope that the num-

the fundamental characteristics of these groups which is that

ber and strength of interest groups would shrink and that par-

individuals have free entrance into and exit from these associa-

ticipation in civic associations would grow conversely. In real-

tions. To illustrate this point Tocqueville compares voluntary

ity the trend is exactly opposite. New interest groups seem to

association to a game played by children who "submit to rules

appear daily in Washington while both the number of civic

settled by themselves and punish offenses that they define

groups and participation in them is declining. How then do

themselves" (1966, 189). The game analogy points out that

we explain decreased participation in civic groups and the

those involved want to participate. If the rules become to

increased energy devoted to interest groups? In this paper I

oppressive, participants are free to leave. But while involved

will argue that the expanded role of government has uninten-

in the game, they are obliged to obey the rules agreed to by all

tionally played an unfortunate and pivotal role in both the

other participants.

decline of productive civic associations needed to build social

Tocqueville points out the contrast that exists

capital and the marked increase of destructive, narrow interest

between free associations and governments which are a form

groups. To show this link, I will examine the reasons people

of permanent association. By their very permanence. even the

form free associations including civic groups and interest

most free form of government is not entirely voluntary. No

groups. I will then explain why these associations are impor-

regime can allow individuals to form a new government when-

tant in a democratic liberal society, and how an expanded role

ever they choose inside the boundaries of the old one. In con-

for government leads to a decline in civic associations and an

erast, many free associations can exist in the same boundaries

expansion of interest groups.

and share the same members while pursuing diverse ends.
Thus governments differ from free associations in that the
latter are entirely voluntary while the former are not.

JASON BEUTLER

2 I

WilY CiVIC ASSOCIATIOI\S ARE IMPORTA:->T IN A DEMOCRATIC

in government affairs. In addition studies show that in soci-

SOCIETY

eties with a large amount of social capital governments typicalFree associations form to accomplish any number of

tasks from educating the youth to securing euthanasia for the

ly receive greater support from the populous (Putnam 1993).
Tocqueville provides additional insights into the

elderly, but they all have one common characteristic: these

importance of free associations for democracies by comparing

groups exist to further a collective interest of all those

democratic and aristocratic society. According to Tocqueville,

involved. If free associations are simply self-interested enti-

the need for free associations is not as great in aristocratic

ties, why then has the decline of one form of free association,

times as it is in times of equality. When aristocracy reigns,

the civic association, become a cause for concern? A large

loyalty to family and class hold people together. Since fami-

number of scholars feel that these associations not only seek

lies seldom change in station, family members typically see

to benefit their members, they also produce a positive side

themselves as part of a continuing chain, rather than a solitary

effect for society as a whole known as "social capital"

individual. 1 Consequently, individuals in aristocratic times

(Coleman 1988).

are willing to give up instant gratification for the sake of their

In a recent Journal of Democracy article,

Robert Putnam explains this capital's importance.

children and grandchildren.
In addition to family connections, aristocratic insti-

For a variety of reasons, life is easier in a communi-

tutions place each person in a class structure. From this posi-

ty blessed with a substantial stock of social capital.

tion, each member of society needs the assistance of people in

In the first place, networks of civic engagement fos-

different castes to accomplish anything. As Tocqueville

ter sturdy norms of generalized reciprocity and

explains it, "each citizen in an aristocratic society has his fixed

encourage the emergence of social trust.

sta tion, one above another, so that there is always someone

works

facilitate

coordination,

Such net-

communication,

above him whose protection he needs and someone below him

amplify reputations, and thus allow dilemmas of col-

whose help he may require" (1996, 507). This position teach-

lective action to be resolved. (Putnam 1995, 67)

es the members of society that they are part of a larger unit
without which they can do nothing. Thus when aristocracy

In other words social capital gained in civic associations is like

reigns, people are held together both by the existence of class-

a blue print that gives people the pattern and equipment need-

es and by the seeming permanence of the family's position.

ed to work together more efficiently in solving the problems

However, the institutions of family and class that

that develop in a community. Since individuals who are civi-

glue the aristocratic society together are loosened or removed

cally involved have learned to work together, they already have

under a democratic regime. Since people are neither absolute-

developed skills and habits such as mutual trust and coopera-

ly dependent on their family nor other people for their exis-

tion that are needed to surmount any new obstacle the com-

tence, they can easily become isolated from the rest of society.

munity might face.

While this withdrawal from social life is not an immediate

Although civic associations begin as a tool for indi-

danger to society as a whole, Tocqueville argues that it plants

viduals to seek their own interests, the abilities gained through

the seeds that can lead to its eventual destruction. In this iso-

these efforts take people beyond actions that arc simply for

lated condition people are easy pawns for an oppressive gov-

private benefit. In working together with others, social capital

anment, because they are not connected to a social network

is developed. Participation in a civic association results in

through which they can accomplish anything. For a tyrant

cooperation spill-overs that may serve the public good in

what better condition can there be than the isolation of all

numerous other aspects of life. For example, people who are

citizens? No group can easily combine to oppose the tyrant.

actively involved civically are morc likely to vote and participate

Thus isolation leaves the masses vulnerable to those who
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would strip them of their liberty (Tocqueville 1966, 507).
Although the isolation that results from equality

something quite similar to what modern scholarship has
begun calling social capital. Although the key descriptive

exposes people to tyranny, this oppression need not come

terms used by recent scholars such as Putnam and Coleman

from a single despot. In a democracy it comes more often

are different than those used by Tocqueville, their conclusions

from the majority. The tyranny of the majority can be Just as

about the importance of civic associations are remarkably sim-

repressive as that of the individual despot. The method of

ilar. All agree that without the positive side effects produced

oppression has simply undergone a metamorphosis. Instead

by civic associations, society as a whole suffers.

of one man controlling the reigns of society, the spirit of
many combines to constrain all to act according to the majority's whims. Tocqueville expresses his feelings toward this

SEEKING AN EXPLANATIO:--.J FOR DECLINING PARTICIPATION

Putnam, Coleman, and Tocqueville all point out the

tyranny as follows. "For myself, if I feel the hand of power

importance of free associations that produce social capital and

heavy on my brow, I am little concerned to know who it is

protect individual liberty. However, there seems to be a clear

that oppresses me; I am no better inclined to pass my head

trend towards decreased participation in these groups. Robert

under the yoke because a million men hold it for me" (1966,

Putnam makes clear that activity in associations from the Boy

436). Tyranny of the majority, then, leads to the same

Scouts to the Red Cross to bowling leagues has declined

bondage as any other form of tyranny. It still constrains indi-

steadily since the late 1960s (1995,69-70). If these associa-

vidual liberty and leaves people as the pawns of some master.

tions are crucial for successful, modern democratic society,

One way to escape tyranny (of one or the majority)
is through free associations which preserve the liberty of the

why are fewer people participating in them?
There are a number of possible explanations for

people. As individuals participate together as part of a larger

declining participation in civic associations. Putnam examines

group, one individual in that group cannot be hurt without

a few of these that seem most serious, including the move-

the entire group knowing about it. Thus the type of oppres-

ment of women into the labor force and changes in the

sion that can creep into a society of isolated individuals is less

American family. However, after careful analysis he concludes

likely to flourish in a society where many free associations

that none of these changes are a satisfactory to explain the

exist, because these groups are capable of acting collectively to

changes in civic participation. If the entrance of women into

protect their members.

the labor market was the primary cause of decreasing civic par-

Both interest groups and civic associations are capa-

ticipation, the number of women involved civically should

ble of collective action to protect participants in their groups

have declined faster than that of men, but this is not the case.

and so it seems that at as a means of preventing tyranny of

Putnam suggests that the most likely cause of decreased par-

the majority or of an individual neither type of association has

ticipation in civic groups is the privatization of leisure actual-

huge advantages over the other. However, Tocqueville makes

ly made possible by technological advances. Individuals can

clear that civic associations not only protect liberty, they also

now be entertained in their own living rooms. Technological

reinforce what he refers to as public virtue. He describes this

innovations such as TVS and VCRs have, Putnam argues,

as a reinforcement process by which "feelings and ideas are

have a heavy impact on civic involvement. (1995, 74-75)

renewed, the heart enlarged, and the understanding developed

Putnam's argument that technology's privatization

only by the reciprocal action of men one upon another"

of leisure has led to the decline of civic associations seems

(1966, 51 5). This reciprocal action of one individual on

plausible when applied to bowling leagues and bridge clubs.

another found in civic association is the primary source of

People only have a certain amount of time to spend bowling

public virtue in times of equality.

or bridging in a league with friends and neighbors, and the

Tocqueville uses the term public virtue, to describe

more of that time quota they fill at home, the less time they
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will have to spend in the entertainment-oriented civic groups

The displacement of civic associations by bureaucra-

in which they once participated. However, this explanation

cy in the name of efficiency is not likely to produce social

seems more limited in explaining the reduced participation in

consequences that are immediately visible, because the social

many other civic groups. Associations such as Boys Scouts,

capital built up by civic association does not dissipate instan-

the Red Cross, and organized religion do more than simply

taneously. With time, however, the repercussions of disinte-

provide leisure for their volunteers. Thus a theory of partici-

grating civic associations become more serious. Tocqueville

pation based on expendable leisure seems too limited, and a

notes that the more government expands to organize society,

more inclusive explanation is needed.

the less capable individual people will be to organize associations that solve even the smallest collective-action problems.

ADMIKISTRATIVE DESPOTISM

If Tocqueville's explanation of free association dis-

Consequently, citizens become even more dependent on government to deal with any new crisis that arises. Seeing these

cussed earlier is right, then these associations are formed and

dangers, Tocqueville asks of those who would have govern-

joined by people as a means of advancing collectively shared

ment replace civil associations:

interests. Thus a straightforward explanation for decreased
participation in these groups would be that either these inter-

Must the public administration cope with every

ests are being met in some other way or the desire to achieve

industrial undertaking beyond the competence of

the goals sought by these organizations has diminished.

one individual citizen? And if ultimately, as a result

In Tocqueville's discussion of free associations he

of the minute subdivision of landed property... must

suggests that a large, centralized bureaucracy would seriously

the head of government leave the helm of state to

undermine civic associations, since the bureaucracy would

guide the plow? (I966, 5 I 5)

essentially take over the responsibilities once performed by
voluntary groups. He names this type of government "admin-

As if to answer Tocqueville's question, the recent

istrative despotism" because, while it works to do the will of

debate over the new farm bill has shown that central govern-

the people, it also robs them of the ability to do things for

ment must in a sense guide the plow. Farmers in many parts

themselves. As government entities take the place of civic

of the country have become so dependent on government to

associations, the social capital that was once formed by partic-

tell them what and how much to plant that the extended

ipation in these organizations also diminishes (I966, 5 I 5).

debate over the farm bill has had an interesting effect.

The logic behind establishing a centralized bureau-

Without governmental guidance many farmers have conceded

cracy is that since it holds the might of government, it is the

that they would have difficulty going forward with spring

most efficient way to carry out large-scale projects that are

planting. The agriculture department has stepped into the

difficult for the people to accomplish. Since government can

role of crop management and now it literally cannot step out

tax all citizens, it can avoid the free-rider problem caused by

without leaving farmers unable to make basic decisions about

those who would otherwise enjoy services without helping to

what crops to grow. Government has taken the place that

pay for them. Recently, many scholars have argued that for

would have once been occupied by free associations

numerous reasons government agencies are not the most effec-

(Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report I995, 2I27-39).

tive means of accomplishing large-scale PCO)ccts,2 bur

Tocqueville saw this form of micro-management by

Tocqueville points out that even more important than the pos-

government as a possibility in diversified, democratic society.

sible inefficiency of an active, centralized bureaucracy is the

Instead of seeking happiness for a few members of society,

danger created by breaking down free associations that are

soft despotism seeks for the happiness of all, but it also wants

needed to produce social capital.

to define what this happiness is. Thus as this form of gov-
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ernment assumes paternal responsibility for society, it keeps

However, when experience with these more grass-root choices

its citizens in a perpetual childhood (1966, 692). While

is limited, the likelihood that people will make the bigger

bureaucratic government may preserve some form of order, it

choices properly is also diminished. When the government

destroys civil society. As Tocqueville notes, in times of equali-

makes decisions for the people which within the context of

ty "a government, by itself, is ... incapable of refreshing the cir-

civic associations could have been made by the people, the

culation of feelings and ideas among a great people" (1966,

individual's ability to make competent decisions declines. As

5 I 6). These feelings and ideas comprise the heart of public

centralized government broadens the scope of its programs,

virtue or social capital that holds the community together.

one unintended consequence is that it undercuts the ability of

Since the aristocratic sources of these public virtues-family

its citizens to make competent decisions about how govern-

and class-have already been weakened or destroyed in the

ment should be run. Thus a centralized, active bureaucracy

democratic society, a pivotal source of these virtues is civic

not only limits the freedom of individuals, it also undermines

association. When bureaucracy replaces associations, order

their ability to use their remaining liberty effectively.

may be momentarily increased, but civic society that is held
together by feelings of community is damaged. Even the

A COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEM

order that is created by governmental intervention is insuffi-

The analysis thus far has shown that the growth of

cient, because, as public virtue decays, ever increasing govern-

centralized bureaucracy leads to the decline of civic associa-

ment intervention is needed. Each new intervention leads to

tions.

calls for further governmental action.

because they help preserve individual liberty and produce

Administrative despotism does not break the will of

These associations are an important part of society,

social capital. Using the language of economics this capital

individuals, but this form of oppression can weaken it. Instead

could be described as a "positive externality" of ciVIC aSSOCla··

of recognizing public problems and working to solve them,

tions, because the benefits from social capital can be felt not

individuals become hard working animals that are directed by

only by those who participate in these groups, but also by the

the state. Some room for free will still exists, but this space is

rest of society as a whole. However, since the 1960s a new

decreased. And the choices individuals under administrative

set of free associations has come to prominence: interest

despotism are allowed to make are strange ones. Tocqueville

groups. These groups, like civic associations, organize volun-

summarizes this paradox as follows: "Under this system the

tarily to pursue some collective end, but unlike Tocquevillean

citizens quit their state of dependence just long enough to

civic associations, interest groups produce "negative external-

choose their masters and then fall back into it" (1966, 693).

ities" by securing some good for themselves at the rest of

Individuals are still oppressed, but they are allowed
to choose those who oppress them. Yet, how competent are

society's expense.
While civic associations have been declining rapidly

humans in this condition of choosing their leaders? Some

during the last thirty years, interest groups have grown at an

scholars have pointed out that there is a direct correlation

alarming rate. Purnam explains that one important difference

between the strength of civic associations and the effective-

between interest groups and civic associations is that interest

ness of government. Robert Putnam notes that since the

groups require very little involvement from their members.

1960s voting, attendance of town meetings, and even the pub-

Most members never attend a group meeting or meet a leader

lie's trust of government has decreased (I 99 5, 69). Over this

of the organization, and they typically make their entire con-

same period of time the size and power of government has

tribution to the organization by writing a check (Putnam

expanded, taking over much of the work once performed by

1995,71). Certainly, this form of interaction is not likely to

voluntary associations. Logically, the small choices made in

develop the social connectedness and sense of trust that are a

civic associations prepare people to make bigger ones.

natural byproduct of civic associations.
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the costs of obtaining them (Olson 1965, I I - 15). Hence the

this new form of free association is that it feeds off the

interest groups that develop to lobby government tend to cen-

expanded role of centralized government. Centralized bureau-

ter around narrow interests that benefit a select few.

cracy not only puts in place new programs that replace civic

Any developing interest group faces an uphill organi-

associations thus damaging the organizations that help create

zational battle, trying to find people willing to donate suffi-

social capital, the expanded role of government also opens up

cient resources to make the group viable. But Olson notes

a new way for groups to seek collective ends. Instead of orga-

that once these groups are formed, they seldom disappear.

nizing along broad goals that encourage large scale private

Consequently, these narrow interest groups tend to build up

support for an organization's activities, interest groups use

over time.

the expanded powers of government to redistribute the wealth

resources, more and more of a society's productive energies

of society for their own benefit. In other words these groups

are sucked into the fight to redistribute already existing

bypass the general public and instead appeal to a small group

resources rather than producing more for everyone. These

of bureaucrats and government officials for resources to pur-

groups find it easier to get the government to redistribute

sue their chosen ends.

wealth in their favor than it is to produce more and to pro-

As interest groups compete for government

duce it more efficiently. Thus, the incentive ro produce new
WHY JOINING AN INTEREST GROUP MAKES SENSE

Although the lobbying efforts of most interest
groups are seen by many as being underhanded and even sinis-

goods is diminished, while the incentive to seek a larger share
of what is already produced increases (Olson 1982).
While the pluralist theory of government maintains

ter, on closer examination it becomes clear that these efforts

that the growth of diverse interest groups is good, because

are simply the most efficient way to pursue a desired end.

these groups counter each other and approximate the public

Since the government has extensive powers and can easily

good (Burns et al. 1993, 252), there are some major problems

divert funds from society as a whole, it is more efficient to

with this theory. As Olson makes clear, it is the narrow inter-

organize a group of people with a narrow interest and use gov-

est groups that have the organizational advantage. As the

ernment as a redistributive vehicle than it is to organize a

number of groups continues to grow, only on rare occasions

group that appeals to a broad public interest and ask for pri-

do groups arise to specifically counter many of the narrow

vate support. Creating a large group that pursues these same

interests. For example, the mohair growers

aims by seeking support from the general public (in the man-

successful for years in securing a subsidy for raising mohair

ner that civic associations gain their support) is harder and

sheep) are not likely to run into the league of anti-mohair

more time consuming. Thus the expanded powers of a cen-

growers, since almost no one except those who grow mohair

tralized government make it the perfect tool for any end-seek-

know what it is, or why the government began subsidizing its

ing organization.

growth in the first place (Rauch 1994). Additionally, the

Mancur Olson best explains the problem caused by

(rt group that was

gains made by narrow interest groups like the mohair growers

interest groups in The Logic oj Collective Action. To explain why

is much larger than the expected gains of any group counter-

interest group lobbying creates problems for the political sys-

ing their efforts. A tax payer would likely save only a few

tem, Olson notes that smaller groups motivated by narrow

tenths of a penny by stopping the mohair subsidy, but the

interests have a tremendous advantage in the interest group

members of this narrowly organiLed group profit handsomely

organization game over large groups with broad interests.

by even a small subsidy since their are not many of them.

Broad interest groups are vulnerable to the free rider problem

Thus as Mancur Olson makes clear, it is the small groups with

witnessed with public goods. This free rider problem can be

narrow interests that have nothing to lose and everything to

best summarized as individuals gaining benefits without paying

gain in transfer-seeking activities

(I 96 5, 33 - 38).
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One possible counter argument that could be made to

bureaucratic agencies cannot produce social capital, the recipro-

support pluralist theory is that public-interest gtoups stand up

cal feeling and habits of cooperation that lead people to work

for the general public by countering activities of other organiza-

together and effectively achieve collective ends. These feelings

tions. But actually public interest gtoupS do not break ftom the

and habits are a natural side effect of civic participation. The

interest gtoup paradigm established by Olson; rather they enrich

second negative consequence of governmental expansion is that

it. Public-interest gtoupS want, in principle, the same thing as all

it is often more efficient for individuals to create narrow inter-

other interest groups: benefits at someone else's expense. These

est groups that seek to divert government resources than it is

groups claim their projects benefit the general public, but their

to form civic associations that can accomplish these same pur-

ideas are seldom embraced by a majority of Americans. Nor do

poses. Thus the energies that might otherwise go into orga-

public-interest groups try to achieve broad-based support before

nizing and maintaining civic associations are diverted into par-

moving ahead with an agenda. Like every other interest group,

asitic, transfer-seeking activities.

public-interest groups attempt to create new programs by appealing to a narrow range of legislators and bureaucrats.

These

groups like others involved in lobbying are typically centered

CONCLUSION

In this paper I have argued that governmental expan-

around an agenda that appeals to only a narrow segment of citi-

sion both displaces civic associations and produces greater

zens while asking tax payers as a whole to pay for the programs

incentives for interest groups to use government as a means of

these groups recommend. Although these groups use the term

redistributing resources. Clearly, the increased bureaucratic

"public interest" to describe themselves, they seek to transfer

centralization of government has not developed as a way to

resources in the same manner as every other interest group with-

supplant civic associations with a feeding frenzy of interest

out gaining large scale public support (Rauch 1994,45-47).

groups, but this has been one of the unanticipated side effects.
This paper is not an attempt to argue that government action

UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES

The proliferation of transfer-seeking interest groups

is never justified, but rather to make clear the dangers of using
government as the primary solution to every collective-action

by itself is a dangerous problem for any society. And the

dilemma. Attempts by government to stop the decline of civic

accompanying decline in civic associations that are needed to

associations and the rise of interest groups through further

build social capital is an equal, if not greater cause for concern.

expansion of governmental power are likely to be counterpro-

Both of these problems can best be described as an unintended

ductive. An effective solution must limit government action in

consequence of expanding governmental powers. Certainly, the

some consistent manner so that interest groups have fewer rea-

government is not the only agent that has contributed to these

sons to invest in governmental lobbying efforts and more

disturbing trends.

incentive to ask for broad-based private support.

However, its growth is a primary source of

The conse-

both the increased energy devoted to transfer seeking and

quence of further governmental expansion is likely to be that

decreased civic participation. As long as government is avail-

civic associations will continue to decline and social capital

able as an easy quick fix to every problem, people are more like-

needed for the wise direction of governmental efforts will

ly to ask for a government solution than to participate in civic

diminish. It is also likely that these unfortunate processes will

associations that can accomplish the same tasks. Thus the

be fed by the growth of narrow interest groups that produce

expanded powers of government have a two-fold negative effect

negative externalities as they bypass the general public good,

on society as a whole. First, as government does the jobs that

appeal to a small group of government officials for access to

civic association once did, the amount of social capital

the public purse, and draw more of society's productive

declines. It is unclear whether government does these jobs

resources into counter-defensive maneuvers that seem necessary

more successfully than civic associations, but it is clear that

to survive the consequences of redistributive politics.
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Post-separation Quebec's NAFTA Accession: Un Blocage Permanent?
by Ryan Geoffrey Baker
INTRODUCTION

The world is becoming increasingly interdependent.

of the U.S. borders, less attention was given to our northern
neighbor, Canada. Ironically, the threat of politics adversely

As interdependence among states increases, so does the number

affecting economics, specifically the trade relationship, is cur-

and significance of international treaties. Treaties involve any

rently greatest in Canada. Quebec, a province of Canada,

number of states and can be political, economic, or both.

threatens secession, and their threat is becoming more and

Because the international system is not static, but is constantly

more serious. In 1980, a referendum on Quebec secession

shifting as states change in number and power, treaties are often

lost, 60 percent voting against Quebec sovereignty. In 1995,

tested by changes in circumstance. International law develops

however, the margin of victory for the federalists was a mere

as treaty members establish customary precedent, solving dilem~

1.2 percent, 49.4 percent voting "yes" and 50.6 percent vot~

mas presented to them by changing circumstances.

ing "no" on the secession issue (Farnsworth 1995, A~I).

The case of Quebec and the North American Free

Any political disturbance north of U.S. borders

Trade Agreement (NAFTA) provides an interesting example of

directly affects the United States because the U.S.~Canada

this phenomenon. In this paper, I will address the status of an

trade relationship is the largest in the world. In 1995, this

independent Quebec relative to NAFTA. Doing this provides

relationship produced $330 billion in trade (U.S. Department

an illustration of the establishment of international legal

of State I 996, Internet). Quebec is a major contributor to

precedent. First I will present a brief summary of Quebec's

U.S.~Canada trade. In fact, Quebec does more trade with

political and economic background. Next, I will analyze the

many Northeastern states than the rest of Canada and Mexico

separatists' arguments and the NAFTA text. Finally, I will

together. The province's 6.9 million people make up 25 per~

consider Quebec's probable course and briefly discuss its

cent of Canada's population, and Quebec is Canada's largest

international law implications.

geographic province. Quebec's geographic size represents
great potential wealth because, according to the World Bank,

BACKGROUND

On 17 December 1992, the United States, Canada,

69 percent of Canada's national wealth is in its natural
resources (1992, Annex I). Overall, Quebec's economy con~

and Mexico signed NAFTA, forming the largest free~trade

stitutes one fourth of Canada's economic base (Bookman

bloc in the world. This event is part of an international

1992, 54). Thus, it is certain that any change in the

trend-freer trade through regional, multilateral treaties.

province's political or economic structure, especially the sort

Although discussion continues over the possible accession of

that would result from secession, would reverberate south of

additional countries, and President Clinton has expressed a

the border. Actually, NAFTA assures such reverberations;

desire to form a Hemispheric Trade Zone, additional NAFTA

some claim that a Quebec secession would throw the U.S.~

membership is unlikely, at least in the near future. For the

Canada and the U.S.~Qu€bec trade relationship into a bind

time being and the near future, NAFTA will be a trilateral

for five to ten years (Fry 1997).

treaty between its original members.
At the time of the signing, there was great concern

Quebec's secession would not only involve internal
costs, it would also be costly to the United States, Mexico, and

over Mexico's socio~political stability. Many worried that

the rest of Canada. Because trade involves mutual benefits, the

Mexico's unstable political system would be a detriment to

lack of trade forfeits benefits; this is especially costly when

NAFTA because of Mexico's economy, which remains vulnera~

people rely upon such benefits for their livelihood. If Quebec

ble to political turmoil. With such a focus on problems south

trade was eliminated or seriously hindered, the entire market

RYAN GEOFFREY BAKER

29

would suffer. In addition, a political-economic NAFTA crisis,

Quebec is responsible for is unclear, Canada may grant

even on a small scale, may drive investors away from the North

Quebec access to its trade markets only if the Quebecois

American market, causing some to invest in Europe instead

assume a large portion of the debt. Although Canada is in the

(Barnhart 1995). Even temporary exclusion and re-entry

stronger position, Quebec brings some chips to the table as

negotiations will involve significant costs for Quebec and the

well. Concerning the debt issue, Quebec could threaten

entire North American market. Perhaps the Quebecois accept

refusal to pay for any of it unless a bilateral trade agreement

these costs as the price of their desired freedoms.

were implemented. Another potential cost to Canada from
excluding Quebec is a devalued currency. Quebec uses the

SEPARATIST ARGUMENTS

The implications of Quebec's separation have not

Canadian dollar, and they claim they will continue to do so
after separation. If Quebec is uses the Canadian dollar and

gone unconsidered by separatist leaders. Separatists-primar-

Canada continues to isolate Quebec's economy, Canada would,

ily leaders of the Bloc Quebecois, Parliament's opposition

in a sense, be shooting itself in the foot. The probability of

party. and the Parti Quebecois, Quebec's majority party-

each of these events taking place remains in question; there-

counter the costly NAFTA exclusion argument with the pro-

fore, the validity of the first separatist assumption also

posal of an immediate post-secession Quebec-Canada trade

remains in question.

agreement. In fact. the text of the most recent referendum

The second separatist assumption, Quebec will gain

question conditioned separation on a Quebec-Canada eco-

NAFTA access. is also uncertain. NAFTA's accession clause

nomic union. This, according to separatists would allow

requires unanimous consent, giving each member veto power.

Quebec to access Canada's markets until full NAFTA access

Thus, Canada could also prevent Quebec from entering

was negotiated. Following such negotiations, they claim,

NAFTA. Quebec could then turn to the United States for

Quebec would gain access to the agreement on terms similar

support, but such support may not be found because of U.S.

to

those is now enjoys.
The separatists make several assumptions in their

concern over the larger trade relationship. The separatists
argue that because of Quebec's robust economy and trade,

arguments. First. they assume that a Canada-Quebec free-

they will be a natural NAFTA addition. While the strength of

trade agreement would be acceptable to Canada. Second, they

Quebec's economy may be obvious today, separation, involving

assume that Quebec will gain access to NAFTA. Finally, they

currency and debt problems, may considerably weaken it.

assume that Quebec's eventual NAFTA access will be on terms

The final assumption made by the Quebecois sepa-

similar to those currently enjoyed. These assumptions are

ratists is Quebec's NAFTA accession, when it comes, will be

questionable and may all be denied in the course of events.

on favorable terms-terms similar to those Quebec currently

The first separatist assumption, the possibility of a

enjoys relative to other NAFTA markets. This seems particu-

Quebec-Canada trade agreement. is problematic. Quebec's

larly unlikely for political and economic reasons. Each mem-

secession would not please Canadians nor would it please

ber-state has veto power, and it is certain that each state will

Parliament. If such an action embitters Western Canada, a

use this power to secure concessions from Quebec. Currently,

bilateral trade agreement will be less likely. Canada will retain

NAFTA members grant several concessions to various

its NAFTA membership and will not be as dependent on

Quebecois markets. For example, the dairy farmers of Quebec

Quebec's trride. retaining at lerist three-fourths of its econom-

arc protected by a set of import restrictions and tariffs

ic base. The Canadirins may use this leverage to punish

(NAFTA 1992, Annex 703.2). This, according to dairy farm-

Quebec or to secure concessions. For instance, the Canadian

ers of the Northeastern U.S., is driving them out of business

government is saddled with an immense debt, much of which

(Fry 1996). Most of Quebec's industry fears any renegotia-

they attribute to Quebec. While the exact figure of debt that

tions because of probable added restrictions.
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Each Separatist assumption is questionable. While
they may hold true, there is no guarantee. It is certain that

however, Quebec secedes, severing itself from Canada's customs laws, it would no longer be a NAFTA member.

Quebec will not have an easy road to NAFTA accession.

According to NAFTA, "A party may withdraw from

Regardless of Quebec's present economic strength, future inter-

lthe 1 agreement

national political and economic factors may block Quebec from

withdrawal to the other parties. If a party withdraws, the

becoming the fourth NAFTA member. Indeed, a sovereign

Agreement shall remain in force for the remaining parties"

Quebec could encounter a blocage permanent from NAFTA.

(NAFTA 1992, Article 2205). There are no special clauses

six months after it provides written notice of

for state fragmentation. Thus, only the original member-gov-

NAFTA's TEXT
Because NAFTA is a treaty among three nations,

ernment retains its membership, and only this government is
bound by the six-month rule. Therefore, Quebec will not

international law allows these three nations to formulate the

enjoy six months of additional membership, and for the pur-

treaty's conditions, as long as they conform to prevailing

poses of the treaty, nothing will have changed-the agreement

international standards. The parties are not bound to give

will remain trilateral between its three original members.

external states any concessions, or, in this case, access to the

External states must rely solely on member-states'

treaty's benefits. This is an area of debate in international

acceptance to gain NAFTA accession. The treaty's accession

law, and, as regional trade blocs increase in number and

clause states the following:

importance, the debate intensifies. Turkey seeks membership
in the European Union (EU), but EU members, for various

I. Any country or group of countries may accede to

political and economic reasons, will not allow Turkey's entry.

this Agreement subject to such terms and conditions

The case of Quebec is unique because it will have unique sta-

as may be agreed between such country or countries

tus as a past key player on the inside that pushed for

and the Commission and following approval

NAFTA's creation and ratification. NAFTA, however, gives no

accordance with the applicable legal procedures of

special consideration to any outside state, even if the state was

each country.

once a part of the agreement. Because NAFTA's accession

2.

clause empowers its members, as does the EU's, Quebec may

Party and any acceding country or group of countries

find itself in a similar situation to Turkey's.

if, at the time of accession, either does not consent

NAFTA defines the three original and current mem-

In

This agreement shall not apply as between any

to such application. (NAFTA 1992, Article 2204)

ber-states by defining their territory. Canada is defined as the
following:

The ambiguity and brevity of this clause leaves the preponderance of power and work to the NAFTA Commission, which

The territory to which its customs apply, including
any areas beyond the territorial seas of Canada, with-

will handle accession bids on a case-by-case basis.
The treaty empowers the Free Trade Commission.

in which, in accordance with international law and its

Article 2001 of NAFTA outlines the composition and func-

domestic law, Canada may exercise rights to the

tions of this commission. It is comprised of each country's

seabed and subsoil and their natural resources.

selected cabinet members or other designated representatives.

(NAFTA 1992, Annex 20l.I)

Many duties are listed in the treaty's text, some are obliged
and others are optional. One requirement is that "all deci-

Thus, if Quebec remains a part of Canada, even under a

sions of the Commission ... [bel ... taken by consensus,

revised constitutional system, they will remain a part of

except as the Commission may otherwise agree" (1992).

NAFTA, and their trade relations will continue unchanged. If,

Each member's possession of veto power does not increase the
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likelihood of reaching a decision, especially on an issue as sig-

tal. Quebec, even after an immediate post-secession recession,

nificant as accession with all of its economic and political

would likely meet any major requirements concerning economic

ramifications.

strength. They will probably have a more difficult time win-

The Institute for International Economics published
NAFTA: An Assessment, reviewing certain elements of the

ning unanimous Commission support for their accession bid.
The failure of NAFTA to restrict members from

treaty. In their discussion of their accession clause, they iden-

forming bilateral treaties in addition to the agreement could

tify several Haws:

be the saving factor for Quebec. Chile, another nation vying
to be the fourth NAFTA member, currently has bilateral trade

First, several of the industry-specific provisions of

agreements with Canada and Mexico, allowing it access to a

the pact (e.g., auto and textiles origin rules) were

significant portion of the NAFTA market.

designed without reference to their possible extension

formed bilateral agreements with either the U.S. or Canada,

to additional countries. Second, the three countries

its economy would stabilize and could subsist even during an

did not spell out either the application procedures or

extended NAFTA exclusion period.

If Quebec

the application procedures or the criteria that new
members would have to meet to join the club.

In

addition, each country remains free to form its own
network of FTAs with other countries that do not

SOVEREIGN QUEBEC'S BID FOR NAFTA ACCESSION:
UN BLOCAGE PERMANENT?

There are many possible scenarios of a sovereign

wish to join NAFTA or are blackballed from NAFTA

Quebec seeking NAFTA accession. International law does not

membership. (Hufbauer and Schott 1993, 114- 15)

provide answers as Quebec's case involves a dispute within an
economic treaty that has not been tested in such a manner.

NAFTA's ambiguity on these issues is either a sign of a hastily

Quebec's situation as a new state seeking access to a trilateral

constructed treaty or a set of intended loopholes. Because

economic treaty to which it was a party as a part of one of the

four years have passed since the treaty was first ratified and

charter members is unique, and this scenario is not addressed

no changes have been made, it seems likely that these "Haws"

by the treaty. Thus, the results of Quebec's NAFTA dispute

are planned loopholes, providing Hexibility.

will create new precedent.

This Hexibility creates some interesting possibilities.

Quebec's first move following secession will be to

First, the various concessions in the treaty, which were not

apply with Canada for a Quebec-Canada economic union.

drafted with additional members in mind, would certainly

This union will benefit Quebec because of trade and invest-

require amendment before more states gain NAFTA accession.

ment Hows between the two nations, and it will ease currency-

For instance, if nations of the Caribbean Basin, a very low-

sharing dilemmas.

cost textile producer, were admitted, current members would

creates a new currency. Canada, however, will not enter into

have to renegotiate portions of the agreement concerning tex-

such an agreement unless Quebec assumes a large part of the

tiles. The extent of such renegotiations is unclear and would

federal debt, perhaps larger than separatist leaders feel Quebec

depend on the situation. The United States has expressed a

is responsible for. Quebec could also use the debt issue in an

desire to avoid large-scale NAFTA renegotiations, and, if such

attempt to coerce Canada into an agreement by threatening to

negotiations would accompany a country's accession bid, the

refuse all debt payment; however, this is unlikely as its nega-

United States would likely block it.

tive effects on Quebec's economic and political image would

The second Haw, NAFTA's lack of specific requirements, allows politics to have a greater role in Commission
decisions. In, Quebec's case, this would probably be detrimen-

Quebec will face serious difficulties if it

cancel any short-term economic gains.
If Canada does not allow a Quebec-Canada economic
union package, Quebec will seek to form a similar agreement
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with the United States and Mexico. Because there are no

Article 2204). Quebec's bid must pass through the

NAFTA restrictions against forming bilateral agreements, the

Commission and meet the legal standards of each country.

dilemma faced by the United States would be whether agree-

The NAFTA Commission is the central player in

ment to such a treaty would damage U.S.-Canada relations.

accession cases. The Commission consists of cabinet-level

Out of frustration or anger, Canada could use political lever-

representatives from each member-state. Because all binding

age and economic threats to block Quebec's entry into a bilat-

decisions of the Commission must be by consensus, each state

eral agreement with the United States.

has veto power. Canada will be able to block Quebec's acces-

However, the

Northeast relies heavily upon Quebec trade, and it is doubtful

sion via the Commission. Quebec will have compelling argu-

that the United States would sever such trade relations. In

ments to make before the Commission. First is Quebec's eco-

fact. Quebec is the U.S. eighth largest trading partner and

nomic strength, placing them far ahead of any non-NAFTA

tremendous cross-border investment links the regions (Nunez

countries in the Western Hemisphere (Nunez 1996, Lexis

1996, Lexis Nexis). Canada's threats could be minimized by

Nexis). Second, Quebec has always been an advocate of free

considering that a U.S.-Quebec agreement would probably not

trade. Both the Bloc Quebecois and the Party Quebecois were

be enough to cause Canada to sever itself from the largest

behind NAFTA, and their strong support made a difference in

economy in the world. Thus, it is quite possible that Quebec

NAFTA's successful ratification, compensating for the rest of

would at least have access to the U.S. market through some

Canada's noncommittal attitude (Lexis Nexis).

sort of bilateral agreement. However, any agreement made by

In order to gain NAFTA accession. Quebec must

Quebec will be costly for the Quebecois. Renegotiations give

obtain consensus and meet each member's applicable legal

states a time to assess the costs and benefits of agreements;

standards. Meeting such legal procedures could include

when the renegotiations are between two parties not on equal

receiving congressional support and the support of the

grounds, the weaker party suffers. In this case, Quebec would

Canadian Parliament. Again, Canada will likely be the biggest

suffer. NAFTA gives certain sectors of the Quebecois econo-

obstacle. Parliament will be even less likely to support

my certain benefits and protections (NAFTA 1992); these

Quebec's accession than the Commission members because it

protections would not last through renegotiations. Such

will be more representative of the views of the Canadian peo-

incentives are usually mutually granted at the time of original

ple, who are most likely to be embittered against Quebec.

treaty negotiation, but when one party already has these pro-

There is also some question over whether or not Canada will

tections, reciprocity for the sake of being friendly is unlikely.

even recognize Quebec's secession. Canada may declare

Once Quebec has secured a bilateral agreement, it

Quebec's claim of sovereignty unconstitutional. This would

will seek membership in NAFTA. A preceding bilateral agree-

render parliamentary ratification impossible, and an interna-

ment is significant for two reasons. First. NAFTA accession

tional self-determination fiasco would ensue.

negotiations will take time, and a bilateral agreement will pro-

It seems that immediately following Quebec's seces-

vide Quebec's economy with some sustenance during that

sion, Canada would act to punish Quebec, blocking their

time. Second, because NAFTA's accession clause is vague,

entry into trade agreements or, at least, requiring stiff terms

with so much depending on the Commission, the favor of one

of entry. In the long run, however, Canada could not afford

or more members will be significant in negotiations.

to ignore the markets of Quebec. Ontario and Western

The NAFTA accession clause states that a country

Canada depend on trade with Quebec and investment in

can gain access to the agreement "subject to such terms and

Quebec's markets, and over time these concerns will likely pre-

conditions as may be agreed between such country ... and the

vail. For Quebec, the critical variable is the duration of the

Commission and following approval in accordance with the

long run. A severance from all of NAFTA's markets for five to

applicable legal procedures of each country" (NAFTA 1992,

ten years would cripple Quebec economically. Even a bilateral

RYAN GEOFFREY BAKER

I

33

agreement with the U.S. over this period of time would not be

thirds of the NAFTA members, if not already the fourth

able to completely replace the trade Quebec does with the rest

NAFTA member, will watch intently. Other nations will also

of Canada. Unfortunately for Quebec, there is no way to cir-

watch and learn from Quebec's scenario as they make their

cumvent the Canadian Free Trade Commission veto. Quebec

own cases for NAFTA accession.

could submit the matter to the World Trade Organization

North America will not exclude Quebec from

(WTO) or the United Nations (UN), assuming that Quebec

NAFTA indefinitely; Quebec's markets are too valuable.

gains membership in these organizations. In these forums,

Thus, the question is how long Quebec's accession will take.

they could argue that Canada is only blocking their NAFTA

If Quebec is blocked from NAFTA for an extended period of

entry out of anger and frustration and that Canada's actions

time, say ten years, the Quebecois economy may whither; this

are an unfair form of punishment. Quebec's legal case would

would certainly have adverse effects on its neighbors. If

be weak at best. Quebec would not have any case at all until

Quebec gains quick access, nations like Chile will argue their

it had completely exhausted its options under the treaty, and

accession cases more vehemently, claiming some form of dis-

this would take some time.

crimination or unfair treatment. Such states may even call for

Secession from Canada will inevitably be costly to

an international tribunal or an arbitration panel under the

Quebec. The price of statehood for the Quebecois would be

WTO to rule on their right to NAFTA access. The possibili-

exclusion from the world's largest free-trade agreement.

ties are endless in the ever-changing field of international law.

Although it seems likely that Canada and the U.S. will eventu-

Thus, while Quebec's separation will not be un blocage per-

ally allow Quebec to enter their markets via bilateral agree-

manent; it will be un bloc age significant, resulting in new

ments and or NAFTA, this will only occur after political ten-

international legal precedent.

sions have subsided; this could take ten years or more (Fry
1997). Thus, although Quebec's secession will not result in a
bloc age permanent from NAFTA, it will sever the region from
its economic lifeblood for an undetermined period of time--a
bloc age significant.
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The Dynamics of Open-Seat Campaigning:
A Case Study of Nevada's Second Congressional District
by Hilarie Hicks Robison
INTRODUCTION

CONFORMATION TO MODEL

Herrnson, however, provides a framework designed
Americans place great value on their democratic con-

specifically for analyzing open-seat campaigns. His model is

stitutional system, which emphasizes representation of the

based on two premises. First, open-seat elections are very

people. Congressional campaigns go to the very heart of this

competitive; they are nearly always won by much smaller mar-

democratic system in determining who will represent the

gins than races which involve an incumbent. Second, the two

American people. Consequently, it behooves us to study the

major factors which determine the outcome of an open-seat

processes and theories surrounding election campaigns. These

election include the partisanship of the district and the "skills

processes and theories will be presented in the following pages

and resources that candidates and their organizations bring to

as they are placed in context through a detailed case study of a

the campaign" (Herrnson 1995,216). The two factors out-

campaign race waged for the United States House of

lined in the second premise were indeed the most important

Representatives in 1996. The players are Republican James

in determining the outcome of Nevada's second Congressional

Gibbons and Democrat Thomas "Spike" Wilson, competing

District race. However, this race did not conform to

for the open seat in Nevada's second Congressional District.

Herrnson's first premise in being extremely competitive.
While the candidates followed Herrnson's prediction of

HERRNSON'S MODEL

Dr. Paul Herrnson, a distinguished professor and

acquiring nearly equal amounts of money (1995, 218), the
race was won by a large margin.

author from the University of Maryland, provides an excellent
framework for studying campaigns in his book Congressional
Elections: Campaigning at Home and in Washington (1995).

THESIS

Interestingly, the very fact that this race for Nevada's

The theoretical context for this study is based on Herrnson's

second district seat conformed to Hermson's second premise

work, not because other writers of merit do not exist, but

provides an explanation for its deviation from the first

because other authors focus on incumbent-challenger races,

premise. The race between Jim Gibbons and Spike Wilson

the dynamics of which are quite different from open-seat cam-

was won by a large margin precisely because of the party com-

paigns. For example, David Mayhew describes advertising,

position of the district and because of the inferiority of the

credit-claiming, and position-taking as the three activities in

skills and resources, i.e., lack of strategic ambition, that Spike

which Congressmen engage (1974). While an excellent analy-

Wilson and his organization brought to the campaign. Due to

sis, this has only a limited application to candidates not cur-

these two factors, the open-seat race to determine the repre-

rently holding elected office. As an interesting note, Jim

sentative for Nevada's second Congressional District does not

Gibbons' campaign manager did indicate that their campaign

conform entirely to Herrnson's model. In the pages that fol-

focused more on advertising (achieving name recognition for

low, the dynamics and intricacies of the campaign, which lead

the candidate) and position-taking rather than credit-claiming

to this conclusion, will be explored.

(Dayton 1996). This is to be expected for a non-incumbent.
Similarly, Richard Fenno's work on "home style," the way in
which a candidate presents himself to his district, applies primarily to incumbents (1978).
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THE NEVADA SECOND CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT

At age 74, Barbara Vucanovich is widely considered
the most conservative woman serving in the House. Her pro-

GEOGRAPHY AND DEMOGRAPHICS

life stance serves to alienate Vucanovich from her female col-

Nevada's second Congressional District was created

leagues (Cook 1996, 31 January). She also often voted

by reapportionment in 1982, Until that time, all of the state

against other "women's issues," such as family and medical

was an at-large district. Geographically, this district encom-

leave. A breast cancer survivor, she now counts "good health"

passes a wide expanse of rural area, taking in nearly the entire

among her blessings (White 1995). According to

state of Nevada, minus only the city of Las Vegas. Although

Vucanovich, her decision to retire was based on a desire to

it comprises 99.8 percent of the state's land area (Cook 1996,

spend more time with her family. "It has been a great honor

31 January), the total district population is only 600,876.

to be here this year working on behalf of Nevadans and serv-

This primarily white population consists of generally

ing in the House Republican leadership during this historic

lower middle-class families. With 64 percent of voters registered

Congress. The time has come, however. for me to take off my

Republican, the NV second is labeled a "likely Republican" dis-

public service hat so I can spend more time with my husband,

trict (Cook 1996, 28 August). As recent presidential elections

George, and my family" (White 1 995).

testify, the area is very friendly toward Republicans, but a tough

Vucanovich's decision to retire reversed an earlier

arena for Democrats. In 1988, Bush received 65 percent here; in

announcement in June of 1995, that she would seek an eighth

1992, Bush received 38, Clinton 33, and Perot 28 percent

term. Vucanovich served as Chairman of the Appropriations

(Cook 1996, 31 January). Of the seventeen counties represent-

Subcommittee on Military Construction. She was also elected

ed by the second district, the number of registered Democrats

Secretary of the House GOP Conference. Although

outweigh registered Republicans in only four.

Representative Vucanovich belongs

Approximately 55 percent of the district is located

[Q

the conservative wing

that swept Congress in 1994, her retirement may have been

in the metropolitan areas of Reno and Carson City, the state

affected by Hermson's theory that elections following an

capitol; 30 percent is suburban Las Vegas; and the remainder

upheaval within Congress are marked by a large number of

is rural Nevada. Consequently, classic "western state issues"

retirements (1995, 33).

such as mining and grazing laws, as well as an interest unique
to Nevada, i.e., gaming, are important. Nevada's second dis-

THE PRIMARY RACE

trict generally is seen as part of the conservative westem bloc,
but has little impact nationally.

Hermson's model predicts that an open seat will
draw a large number of primary contestants, as well as more

REPRESENTATIVE BARBARA VUCANOVICH

CR, NY)

Since its creation in 1982, conservative Republican
Barbara Vucanovich has represented Nevada's second

money and resources (1995, 17). This was certainly true of
the primary elections in Nevada's second district, especially in
the Republican party.

Congressional District. In December of 1995, while serving
her seventh term, Representative Vucanovich announced that
she would not seek reelection. Though she received 64 per-

REpUBLICAN CANDIDATES

Spurred by Vucanovich's retirement in this

cent of the vote in 1994, 1992 was a different story. In a

Republican district, there was no shortage of qualified, experi-

field of numerous candidates, Vucanovich retained her seat

enced GOP candidates vying for the nomination. As

with only 48 percent of the vote (Cook 1996, 31 January).

Hermson predicts, the race pitted several state elected offi-

Fear of losing a reelection bid, however, did not evidently

cials against each other (1995,46). The GOP roster boasted

affect her decision to retire.

Vucanovich's own daughter, Patty Cafferata; state
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Assemblyman Jim Gibbons; former Secretary of State Cheryl

guished, boasting former Virginia City prostitute Jesse

Lau; rural miner Pat Macmillan; Las Vegas attorney Mike

Winchester; security guard Mike Martin; and David Ward, a

Schaefer; stockbroker Hilary Milko; retiree Bob Edwards; and

cable TV salesman who dropped out before the primary race.

State Treasurer Bob Seale.

It was not until the last day to file, June 4, that Thomas

As the incumbent's daughter, Patty Cafferata was
expected to have an edge in the race. She was a former Reno
assembly member, ex-State Treasurer, unsuccessful candidate

"Spike" Wilson added his name to the list of candidates for
the Democratic primary race.
Wilson, a Reno attorney and "fiscal conservative,"

for governor in 1986, and currently the district attorney for

served in the state Senate and on the Nevada Ethics

Lander County. Strongly pro-life, Cafferata labeled herself as

Commission (Morrison 1996). Among the Democrats, he

"the most conservative of the candidates running" (American

provided the only evidence of political experience or qualifica-

Political Network 1996, 8 March). She promised to get gov-

tions. Due to his late entry, Wilson had little time to solicit

ernment "off the backs of and out of the pockets of citizens"

campaign contributions for the primary season, but he did

(American Political Network 1996,8 March).

receive over $ 80,000, which he added to $ 100,000 of his own

Jim Gibbons had served in the state Assembly and,

money (FEC 1996, September).

as the Republican nominee for governor in 1994, garnered 4 I
percent of the vote against incumbent Bob Miller. In favor of
abortion rights, Gibbons labeled himself a mainstream conser-

THE RESULTS

Nevada's primary election was held on September 3,

vative. Treasurer Bob Seale claimed to be "conservative on fis-

1996. It produced no surprises. Gibbons won the

cal issues" (American Political Network 1996,8 March). He

Republican primary with 43 percent of the vote, followed by

also favors abortion rights.

Cafferata and Lau. In the Democratic primary, Wilson won

In this campaign for the U.S. House, Gibbons'

handily with 62 percent of the votes despite his late entry

internal polls, conducted by Wirthlin Worldwide in May of

(Vogel 1996, 4 September). Although Herrnson calls open-

1996, showed him leading the GOP pack by a margin of more

seat primaries "the most competitive of all nominating con-

than 40 points against Cafferata and Seale (American Political

tests" (1995,46), both Gibbons and Wilson won their pri-

Network 1996, 8 March). As Herrnson would predict,

maries by significant margins (20 percent for Gibbons and

Gibbons' early lead in the polls helped to attract substantial

nearly 40 percent for Wilson). This is additionally surprising

campaign funding (1995,218). Throughout the primary sea-

in the Republican camp because of the qualifications and

son, Gibbons received more than $265,000 in campaign con-

experience of the other candidates. Perhaps the wide margin

tributions, compared to Cafferata's $95,000 and Seale's

of victory reflects the large differences in the amount of cam-

$82,000 (FEC 1996, September).

paign funding each candidate was able to acquire.

A poll conducted in July by the Las Vegas ReviewJournal confirmed Gibbons' internal findings; he led his

THE CANDIDATES

Republican primary challengers as well as Democrats (Morrison
1996). Due to the findings of this poll, Bob Seale dropped out

Hermson submits that the best qualified office-seek-

of the race, blaming his poor showing in the polls for blocking

ers wait until an open seat becomes available rather than face a

his fundraising efforts (Morrison 1996). Ironically, he withdrew

formidable incumbent (1995, 36). The two candidates for

too late to have his name removed from the ballot and finished

Nevada's second Congressional District's open seat could both

fourth in the race with 4 percent of the vote (Vogel 9/4/96).

be considered experienced. Gibbons had the advantage of

DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATES

name recognition from having run a state-wide election previ-

The Democratic primary roster was less distin-

ously. (Because the district covers the entire state, campaign-
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ing in it is virtually the same as running for a state-wide

tures are particularly influential" in spreading a candidate's

office.) Wilson's delay in filing his candidacy perhaps illus-

name recognition and message (1995,218). Gibbons

trates his hesitancy to run as a Democrat in such a conservative

achieved this advantage by entering the race early and behaving

district. Though Gibbons was not an incumbent, Wilson may

strategically, while Wilson missed out because he filed his can-

have seen his opponent as a formidable challenge. Ironically,

didacy much later.

the two men's careers have evolved along similar paths.
DEMOCRAT THOMAS "SPIKE" WILSON
REpUBLICAN JAMES GIBBONS

A native Nevadan, Jim Gibbons earned his law

Unfortunately, it is necessary to begin here with a
disclaimer. Spike Wilson's campaign offices and staff were

degree, then became a pilot for Delta Airlines. Previously, he

less than helpful in providing information. Due to their

worked as a mining geologist and served in the United States

refusal to answer questions and provide campaign literature,

Air Force, experiencing combat duty as a secret-missions pilot

the sources used to compile a profile of Spike Wilson and his

in the Vietnam War and voluntarily in the Persian Gulf during

campaign are quite limited. This difficulty in dealing with the

Operation Desert Storm. Gibbons, age fifty-one, is proud of

candidate and his campaign suggest that Wilson is not overly

his wife, daughter, and two sons, whose pictures he flaunted

personable or helpful, which are qualities heavily associated

throughout various campaign literature.

with casework. Perhaps Wilson's apparent weakness in con-

Gibbons served three terms in the Nevada State

stituency relations stems from the fact that he knew he was

Assembly, where he authored the popular Gibbons Tax

waging a lost-cause campaign. From the beginning, Wilson

Restraint Initiative. This initiative, requiring all tax increases

knew his chances for victory were minimal, but "this is a race

to be approved by two-thirds of the state legislature, was on

that someone had to make ... .! had a ball" (Wilson quoted in

the ballot this year and passed quite easily on election night

Morrison and Vogel 1996).

(Morrison and Vogel 1996,6 November). As the Republican

Thomas "Spike" Wilson, age sixty-one, was also

nominee for governor in 1994, Gibbons made this conserva-

born and raised in Nevada. He served as a federal prosecutor,

tive legislation the centerpiece of his campaign (American

then became a partner in a law firm with offices in Reno and

Political Network 1994, 13 October). Though seen as a con-

Las Vegas. As a Democrat, he served from 1970 until 1986

servative Republican, Gibbons was labeled by the Abortion

in the Nevada State Senate, where he claimed to be "fiscally

Report as pro-choice (American Political Network 1994, 19

conservative" and "careful with your l constituents'] tax dol-

October) and declared that government should not involve

lars" (Morrison 1996). Wilson helped to create the biparti-

itself in the abortion issue (Gibbons and Cafferata 1996).

san Nevada Commission on Ethics in Government in 1985,

Gibbons fits the criteria for what Herrnson calls a

and served as its chair from 1989 until 1996. In 1991, he

strategic politician. Candidates who behave strategically pos-

received the Ethics in Government award from Nevada Common

sess "a desire to get elected, a realistic understanding of what

Cause (Wilson 1996).

it takes to win, and an ability to assess the opportunities pre-

Though a Democrat, Wilson declined to align him-

sented" (Hermson 1995, 3 1). Gibbons fits this category

self with Clinton and his party in this conservative district.

because he obviously exercised much thought and preparation

Calling himself the "independent voice for Nevada," Wilson

in evaluating his candidacy. He announced his candidacy on

promised that he would not be another "sure" vote for party

December 5, 1995, long before any other competitors. With

leaders. "Congress must stop the finger pointing and partisan

this head start, Gibbons began raising money (and thus

bickering, and put the very best ideas of both parties to work"

spending money) and conducting polls early in the campaign

(Wilson 1996). Despite Clinton's general popularity nation-

season. As Herrnson illustrates, "a campaign's initial expendi-

wide, Wilson evidently realized that, due to the conservative
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nature of this district, aligning himself with the president

committees (PACs), and party committees than will a chal-

would not be politically profitable.

lenger race (1995, 17). With high political stakes up for

Although Wilson was politically experienced, having

grabs in an open seat, many groups find it advantageous to

campaigned and held office in the state, it is doubtful whether

support their candidate of choice. Hence, both Spike Wilson

he behaved strategically in this campaign. Institutionally,

and Jim Gibbons received substantial campaign contributions,

strategic politicians examine factors including filing deadlines

Candidates are required to report the contributions

and campaign finance laws (Herrnson 1995, 3 I). Wilson

they receive to the Federal Election Commission (FEC),

seemed to lack understanding regarding both of these factors.

which then makes this information available to the public. In

He barely met the filing deadline and failed to conform to

the general election, Jim Gibbons spent nearly $ 500,000. He

Federal Election Commission rules requiring a declaration of

received most of his money, close to $400,000, from individ-

receipts and contributions (Paxon 1996).

ual contributors. PACs, primarily those associated with casi-

Structural factors involved in strategic ambition
include examining the geography and partisan composition of
the district (Herrnson 1995, 3 I). If Wilson did make such

nos and other businesses, donated approximately $ 130,000 to
the Gibbons campaign (FEC 1996, December).
Although Herrnson's framework predicts that the

an examination, he did not heed the warning signs. The large,

party not in control of the presidency (in this case, the

sprawling district is Republican-dominated and requires exten-

Republican party) will use more of its resources to support

sive travel and money to spread one's name and message

incumbents (1995,80), the National Republican

throughout the district. A poll taken during the primary sea-

Congressional Committee gave the maximum contribution

son indicated that 53 percent of the district's voters did not

allowed to the Jim Gibbons campaign. After all. the commit-

even recognize Wilson's name (Morrison 1996). In contrast

tee's primary goal is to maximize its party's seats in Congress,

with Bob Seale, however, Wilson opted to remain in the race,

and the Nevada second district seat was "likely Republican"

saying the numbers did not depress him. "I just see room for

(Cook Political Report 1996, 28 August).

growth" (Morrison 1996).
Wilson may have focused on national forces, such as

From the beginning of the general election, Gibbons
led Wilson in the polls and the lead continued to widen as the

Clinton's likely victory, instead of local circumstances as a

election drew closer (American Political Network 1996,4

strategic politician would (Herrnson 1995, 31). According to

October). Given this lead in the polls, Herrnson theorizes

Herrnson's model, a politician behaving strategically would not

that Gibbons will attract more money and resources than

run in the circumstances Wilson met. On the other hand, our

Wilson (1995,218). This proved true in the Nevada second

democratic idealism prefers the presence of an opponent with

district campaign, but the difference was quite small. Spike

slim chances to a strategic politician in an unopposed race.

Wilson spent approximately S450,000 on the general election
(FEC 1996, December).

CAMPAIGN FINANCES

Wilson received almost $250,000 from individual
contributors. Most of his PAC money, totaling over

With each successive election year, the amount of

$ 1 00,000, was donated by national organizations, such as the

money it takes to wage a campaign increases. Many have spec-

Federal Express PAC and the National Education Association

ulated on the impact such money-centered campaigns have on

PAC, as well as labor organizations. Interestingly, a number of

our democratic system, but here it is necessary only to analyze

casino corporations that contributed to Gibbons' campaign

its effects in the race at hand. As pointed out earlier,

also gave money to Spike Wilson (FEe 1996, October and

Herrnson's framework predicts that an open seat will attract

December; Kanigher and McCall 1996). Evidently, these casi-

more money and assistance from individuals, political action

no PACs exercise access strategies, contributing to both candi-
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dates so that they are guaranteed access regardless of who

challengers and those by incumbents in regard to the profes-

wins the election (Herrnson [995, 110), Information

sionalization of the staff and organization. The majority are

regarding the Democratic Congressional Campaign

managed by a paid staffer, some have professional media con-

Committee's involvement in Wilson's campaign is unavailable.

sultants, and most candidates have their polling done by pro-

Despite the integral role that money seems to play

fessionals. Other functions, such as press relations, fundrais-

in modern elections, it is not always the most important fac-

ing, and issue research, is often done by volunteers in open

tor. Although Gibbons and Wilson spent similar amounts of

seat campaigns (Herrnson 1995,64-69).

money, there was a wide margin between them in the election

Due to my difficulty in obtaining information from

results. Perhaps voters do see beyond the resources money

the Wilson campaign, I cannot compare his campaign organi-

can buy. Or, as is more likely in this case, party identification

zation to the model; however, Gibbons' campaign largely con-

is simply more important to voters than how many television

forms to Herrnson's pattern for organization. Jim Gibbons'

ads a candidate can buy.

campaign manager, Mike Dayton, was a paid professional.
Wirthlin Worldwide, a well-known and respected firm, con-

ON THE CAMPAIGN TRAIL

ducted several polls for Gibbons. His campaign relied on
outside political consultants for some advice on advertising.

Numerous factors playa significant role in the out-

and the National Republican Congressional Committee pro-

come of a campaign for office. Obviously, the role of money

vided its research. The rest of Gibbons' campaign staff was

is very substantial, as has been discussed. Beyond that, how-

comprised of volunteers, who handled press relations and

ever, variables such as campaign organization and staff, priori-

fundraising (Dayton 1996). The entire Gibbons family was

ties made in determining the campaign budget, and campaign

involved in the campaign, especially the candidate's son,

strategies, including the issues, themes, and messages which a

Christopher, age twenty-one, who designed an Internet home

candidate embraces, are extremely significant. Each of these

page for his father: http://www.gibbons4congress.com.

factors can be used in such a way as to mean the difference
between winning and losing an election.

CAMPAIGN BUDGETS

In addition to the organization of campaign staff,
CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATIONS

In Herrnson's model of campaign staff and organiza-

the professionalism of a congressional campaign can be Judged
by how its money is budgeted. In the way they allocate funds,

tions, incumbents clearly have an advantage with more experi-

there are virtually no differences among incumbents, chal-

enced staff and resources (I 99 5, 63). In the open seat race at

lengers, and open-seat candidates. Generally, candidates spend

hand, however, Herrnson indicates that nonincumbents who

76 percent of campaign funds in voter communication, J 8

have previously held an elected position have an advantage in

percent for overhead expenses, and 6 percent on polling and

assembling their campaign organization (1995,64). Both

research. Further breaking down the voter communication

Gibbons and Wilson held elected posts, but neither of them

percentages, most candidates budget J J percent of their total

had an ongoing support club. Their respective organizations,

funds for radio, [8 percent for televislOn, another J 8 percent

the "Jim Gibbons for Congress Committee," and "Nevadans

for direct mail, 4 percent for newspapers, and the remaining

for 'Spike' Wilson" were both organized specifically for this

25 percent for field activities. (Herrnson 1995,73)

race. However, it is most likely that each candidate has a tight

As discussed above, this information is not available

circle of staunch supporters who have been through other

for the Wilson campaign, and Gibbons' campaign budget

state and local campaigns with him.

largely does not conform to Herrnson's model, due primarily

Open seat campaigns fall between those waged by

to the geographical expanse of Nevada's 2nd district and some
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In contrast with the usual 18 percent spent on over-
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As Herrnson points out, campaigns do not intend to
reach everyone; that would be impossible. Instead, most can-

head, Gibbons' campaign manager indicated that their overhead

didates focus their campaign efforts on members of their own

comprised closer to 5 percent of the budget because of numer-

party and independent voters (Hermson 1995, 164). This is

ous in-kind donations. Field activities, including travel, make

true of the Jim Gibbons campaign, but there is no available

up only 10 percent of the Gibbons budget. This is surprising

information regarding Spike Wilson's targeting strategies.

in a district where campaigning requires travel throughout the

In addition to this general targeting, Herrnson dis-

entire state. (Perhaps Gibbons' employment as a pilot for

cusses the importance of soliciting specific groups of voters;

Delta Airlines facilitated this.) Approximately 5 percent was

" ... communicating a message to identifiable groups of sup-

spent on polling, done by Wirthlin Worldwide, and 10 percent

porters and undecided voters is important in the campaign for

on direct mail. In describing open-seat races, Herrnson theo-

votes" (Herrnson 1995, 166). The Gibbons campaign used

rizes that" direct mail has the biggest impact on vote shares,

Herrnson's group-oriented approach, which says that "there

followed by radio and television" (1995, 2 19). Gibbons' allo-

are identifiable segments of the population whose support the

cation of funds does not exactly fit Herrnson's pattern.

campaign needs to attract and that specific communications

The major discrepancies between Gibbons and the

can be tailored to win that support" (Herrnson 1995, 166).

typical campaign are in the amount spent on radio and televi-

According to Gibbons' campaign manager and as evidenced by

sion advertisements. As is becoming more common every

his campaign literature, the Republican candidate focused on

election year, television was the major budgetary item in the

specific population segments like veterans and seniors.

campaign. While Gibbons spent only 5 percent of his total

As a veteran of two wars himself, Gibbons already had

budget on radio, a phenomenal 60 percent went toward televl--

one foot in the door WIth that group. Gibbons designed his

sion (Dayton 1996). These discrepancies may be explained

crime reduction plan to protect "our neighborhoods from vio-

by looking at the different media markets throughout the

lent criminals who prey on our society's most vulnerable: our

state. To reach the entire second district, a candidate not only

elderly citizens and our children" (Jim Gibbons, Plan 1996).

has to advertise in Reno and the extensive rural areas, but also

Citing the contributions that seniors and veterans have made to

in the Las Vegas area, where 20,000 of the district's registered

the state of Nevada, Gibbons vowed to protect them. "We can

voters reside. In this urban center's media market, television

count on Jim Gibbons and his commitment to Nevada seniors

advertising is costly, but radio is less expensive and one radio

and veterans" (Jim Gibbons, Uncommon 1996). Spike Wilson

station may reach a larger number of voters.

also tried to reach out to seniors, promising "I won't vote to
cut Social Security" (Wilson 1996).

CAMPAIGN STRATEGY

Campaigns do not just "happen." They are carefully planned and designed; the candidate, together with politi-

MESSAGE

The campaign message is a combination of imagery

cal consultants, family, and friends, thinks through every

and the candidate's position on certain issues. Herrnson

move he makes. Analyzing what will appeal to voters in the

describes the most successful messages as thematic, prevalent

current environment is quite an art, one which every candi-

throughout every ad, pamphlet, and speech. In an attempt to

date tries to perfect. To do so, they choose which groups of

project a coherent image of the candidate, messages are gener-

voters to target and the message, including issues and image,

ally a mixture of party affiliation, issue positions, personal

which they will portray throughout the campaign. Much of

accomplishments, and qualifications for office (Herrnson

this is manifested in campaign literature.

1995, 168-9). Especially in a close race, campaign messages

TARGETING

can become a determining factor in the outcome of the election. Though not the most important ingredient, candidate
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messages were important in the race for Nevada's second

advertisements. This image of a caring family man essentially

Congressional District.

became Gibbons' "home style" (Fenno 1978) and served well

In an open seat, Hermson's model predicts that
candidates will strive to portray themselves as "caring, hard-

as an overarching theme that hit home with numerous voters.
Issues. Spike fared better in presenting his issues

working, and experienced" (1995, 170). In Nevada's sec-

than his image. Clearly, this Democrat understood the impor-

ond district, Jim Gibbons embraced all three attributes

tance of alienating himself from the Clinton/Gore ticket in

quite successfully, while Spike Wilson emphasized his quali-

this district. Stressing his independence, Spike promised not

fications and what his agenda would be as a member of

to be "another sure vote for the leaders of either party"

Congress. While both candidates chose a few issues to

(Wilson 1 996). His primary issue focus was on families.

emphasize, only Gibbons was successful in portraying a

Despite his promise to be an independent voice, Spike Jumped

coherent image of himself.

on the national bandwagon in calling for tax credits for child

Image. Wilson's campaign "image" consisted of a
picture of himself, the headline "We like Spike," and the subtitle "the Independent voice for Nevada" (Wilson 1996). As a

care and education, health insurance access and portability, and
pay and pension equity for working women (Wilson 1996).
These family issues did not exactly play out as

Democrat in a largely Republican district, he was trying to

Wilson's trump card, however. Wilson simply talked about

disassociate himself from the party ticket. Voters were not

helping families, while Gibbons portrayed it in action. As it

given the opportunity to meet Spike as a person, even through

is said, a picture is worth a thousand words; or a thousand

simple words on paper. A few qualifications were listed, but

votes, as the case may be. Wilson also talked about "ending

no family was ever introduced (Spike is divorced), and trust-

corporate welfare" through changes in tax policy and achieving

worthiness or caring were not discussed. To some Nevadans,

political reform through tough ethics (Wilson 1996).

Spike may have come across as a cold politician. With the

Jim Gibbons' focus on a few broad issues further

large party barrier to overcome, this lukewarm portrayal of

helped him achieve coherence as he repeated his message in

Spike Wilson's image was quite a blunder. Evidently, Wilson

every ad and leaflet. Gibbons followed Hermson's model in

was attempting to portray a "home style" (Fenno 1978) that

identifying himself with valence issues (Hermson 1995,

focused on experience and a future agenda more than identify-

170). He took policy stands on protecting seniors and veter-

ing with the people as one of them.

ans, cracking down on crime, and improving education-

Republican candidate Jim Gibbons scored high

issues which generate little controversy and draw large sup-

points in the portrayal of a consistent, likeable, and comfort-

port. While he outlined specific policy goals, Gibbons con-

able image. He stressed his past record of fighting for

tinually emphasized the broader valence issues. Gibbons also

Nevadans and filled his campaign literature with pictures of a

campaigned on the issue of tax restraint, echoing the initiative

caring Jim Gibbons reading to children or helping seniors find

he authored that was passed at the same time he was elected

solutions to their problems (Jim Gibbons, Uncommon 1996).

to Congress. In this Republican district, Gibbons did not

Gibbons also used his role as an Air Force veteran to transmit

shie away from the Dole-Kemp national ticket and openly sup-

a certain image of patriotism and honor, saying "I was willing

ported Dole's plan for a 1 5 percent across-the-board tax cut

to fight for my country-I'm willing to fight for Nevada"

(Vogel 1996, 27 October). Wilson opposed any tax cut until

(Jim Gibbons 1995). Both the military and politics are about

Congress balances the budget (Vogel 1996,27 October).

leadership and public service.
The most consistently-used image, however, was a

During the primary campaign, Gibbons addressed a
wider array of issues, especially emphasizing classic states'

lovely portrait of Jim with his wife and three children. It was

rights in claiming that the "federal government is too heavy-

included in every piece of direct mail and many television

handed" (Henley 1996), and therefore we should "let Nevadans
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run Nevada" (Chris Gibbons, Jim's Stand 1996). In issues

story about Spike Wilson," they labeled him as an out-of-

regarding Nevada's mining and ranching interests, Gibbons

touch politician (NV Republican Party 1996).

claimed that the federal government has been" waging war on

In the last weeks of the campaign, Wilson accused

the west" (Henley 1996), in preventing Nevada from control-

Gibbons of "attack ads" and Gibbons tried to paint Wilson as

ling its own state land. True to his party, Wilson favored leav-

a Clinton liberal (Morrison and Vogel 1996). Discussing

ing Nevada's lands in the hands of the federal government.

Clinton's interventions in Iraq, the two candidates got their

Gibbons also argued in favor of popular national issues, such as

hands a little muddy. Wilson bordered on calling Gibbons, a

balancing the federal budget, welfare reform, and revamping

veteran of two wars, unpatriotic (Vogel 1996, 19 September).

Medicare (Chris Gibbons, Jim's Stand 1996). However, all of
these issues faded into the background during the general elec-

AND THE WINNER

Is .....

tion campaign in favor of those discussed above.
In the Wilson campaign, issues were used more

The results of the general election held on

extensively than images. Gibbons also focused on issues, but

November 5, 1996, like those of the primary, were not unex-

his family picture, so prevalent throughout the campaign,

pected. They were in line with results indicated in earlier

seemed to be the overriding theme. Perhaps due to the large

polls (Morrison 1996; American Political Network 1996, 30

and diverse nature of the district, both candidates steered

May). For the open seat in Nevada's second Congressional

away from local concerns, (which have the potential to arouse

District, Republican Jim Gibbons won with 58 percent of the

opposing viewpoints in the urban and rural areas) to embrace

vote. Gibbons beat Democrat Spike Wilson, who garnered 36

larger issues. Gibbons' family portrait served as a universal

percent of the vote, by a margin greater than 20 percentage

theme, striking chords in this area largely populated by tradi-

points (Morrison and Vogel 1996).

tional families. Also due to the district's extensive geographic

In order to explain the outcome of this race, there

area, Gibbons and Wilson were required to travel and cam-

are several relevant factors to address. These include the types

paign throughout the state, walking the neighborhoods every-

and groups of voters which supported each candidate, the

where from Elko to Las Vegas. Out of necessity, both candi-

national context in which the race took place, and the party

dates maintained offices and campaign personnel in Reno as

identification within the district. Also, it is interesting to

well as Las Vegas.

explore the explanation given by the losing candidate.
Gibbons was supported throughout the race and in

NEGATIVE CAMPAIGNING

This congressional race was clouded by very little

his victory by traditionally conservatIve Republican groups, such
as the National Rifle Association and Citizens for Responsible

negative campaigning. The candidates participated in seven

Government, as well as business-related associations like the

debates together and remained civil in each one (Vogel 1996,

U.S. Chamber of Commerce. These groups endorsed Jim

27 October). Both Gibbons' and Wilson's television cam-

Gibbons, as did other local and state associations (Chris

paign advertisements remained relatively positive, but a couple

Gibbons, Endorsements 1996; Vogel 1996, 2 7 October). Also,

of incidences are noteworthy.

retiring Representative Barbara Vucanovich endorsed Gibbons in

In particular, the Nevada Republican Party published

the general campaign (after he defeated her daughter in the pri-

a pamphlet attacking Spike Wilson's history of voting in favor

mary), calling him "a man of integrity, decency, and a sense of

of raising taxes on Nevada citizens. According to their cam-

compassion" (NV Republican Party 1996).

paign literature, Wilson voted to raise his legislative salary and

Wilson also had numerous supporters and endorse-

perks twelve times and to raise taxes and fees over three hun-

ments, especially from state and local unions, such as the

dred times while serving in the state senate. Telling the "real

Nevada AFL-CIO, the Nevada State Education Association,
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and the Service Employees International Union Local 1864
(Vogel 1996,27 October). An obvious difference is the

Gibbons, had a clear advantage based on party cue voting.
Neither Jim Gibbons nor Spike Wilson was sur-

national scope of the groups which supported Gibbons versus

prised by the outcome of the race. In line with Herrnson's

the local nature of Spike's supporters. National groups like

theory that winners attribute their success to image and issues

the NRA have a broader membership and more money with

(I 99 5, 219), Gibbons credited his victory to his past experi-

which they can support the candidate. This gave Gibbons an

ence and issue positions. Although it is natural for Spike to

edge in the campaign and demonstrates the power of endorse-

be disappointed, he knew from the beginning that for him this

ment as a resource.

race was basically a lost cause (Morrison and Vogel 1996).

The population segments which voted for Gibbons

As discussed earlier, he knew his chances were very slim and

and Wilson mirror the types of groups and associations which

thus he did not put forth the effort necessary to be competi-

supported each candidate. Republicans overwhelmingly chose

tive; i.e., Spike did not behave strategically. Hence,

Gibbons, as did many Independents and some Democrats.

Herrnson's model that shows the losing candidate placing

Many Democrats toed the party line in voting for Spike, but

blame and obsessing about money (1995, 219) does not

they were simply outnumbered by registered Republicans in

apply here. Spike Wilson did not blame anyone for his defeat,

the district (Dayton 1996). Clearly, this race is a good exam-

instead positioning himself almost as a martyr for the democ-

ple of party politics.

ratic system. Spike can be seen as a candidate who entered the

Although redistricting was not a factor in this race,
the presence of a presidential election did playa role. As

race simply to provide an element of opposition, without any
real hope of personal victory.

Herrnson points out, presidential election years spur a larger
turnout of voters (1995, 17). Such years also have a poten-

CONCLUDING ANALYSIS

tial for coattail effects, but these were not realized in the
Nevada second district race nor throughout the nation. In the

In Herrnson's model, open-seat races are character-

case at hand, Clinton's coattails may have been replaced by

ized by their intense competition. Yet at no time on election

those of Representative John Ensign of Nevada's first

night (or throughout the campaign season) was this race "too

Congressional District.

close to cal\." What explains the deviation in this race from

Ensign, a staunch Republican, served as a freshman

Herrnson's theory?

There are two reasons that the race for

in the 104th Congress and retained his seat by a huge margin

Nevada's second Congressional District was won by 22 per-

of victory in 1996. Ensign has been very popular with casino

centage points instead of the small margin predicted by

magnates as well as the general populace, so the several public

Hermson. First, the majority of voters in the district identi-

appearances he made with Gibbons may have brought in more

fied themselves as Republicans, which was a heavy weight in

money and votes for the second district candidate (see

favor of Gibbons. Second, Wilson did not behave as a strate-

Morrison and Vogel 1996; Vogel 1996, 4 September).

gic politician. Spike's delay in filing his candidacy, his mis-

The most important factor in determining the out-

takes in reporting to the FEC, and his weakness in constituent

come of this race was undoubtedly the party cue. Herrnson's

relations (casework), because he saw his campaign as a lost

theory includes explanations for voting decisions. One of

cause, all point to this conclusion. Hermson predicts that

these explanations is that voters will choose the candidate with

only strategic politicians will be successful; Spike was not

whose political party they identify themselves. This party cue

strategic, so the race was not highly competitive and he lost

"also enables voters to speculate about a candidate's ideological

by a wide margin.

orientation and issue positions" (Herrnson 1995, 159). In
Nevada's second district, the Republican party, and hence Jim

This study of an open-seat race in Nevada's second
Congressional District, in the context of Herrnson's frame-

HILARIE HICKS ROBISON

work and the J 996 election, provides insight into the ele-

I
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_ _ _ _ . J 996. Nevada Congressional races.

ments that are necessary to wage a successful campaign, Such

http://www.electionline.com/HTEL/shounvOfront 96/page

a campaign is an example of the very processes that are inte-

I.cgi. September.

gral to our American democratic constitutional system.
_ _ _ _ . 1996. Nevada district 2 census information.
http://www.electionline.com/HTEL/ dhoun vO 2cens us 90/ p
WORKS CITED

age J .cgi. September.

American Political Network, Inc. J 994. Ballot initiatives:
Hotline analyzes key state props of '94.

The Hotline.

J 3 October.

House candidates.
http://www.fec.gov/1996/states/nv_OJ.htm. September.

American Political Network, Inc. J 994. Governors: 1994
abortion report candidate list. Abortion

Federal Election Commission. 1996. Financial activity of

Report. 19

October.

_____ . 1995. NY 02 '96: Pro-life Yucanovich announces
her retirement. Abortion Report. 5 December.

_ _ _ _ . 1996. NY 02: Like mother, like daughter? The
Hotline. 8 March.

_ _ _ _ . 1996. NY 02: Internal poll shows Gibbons leading GOP pack. The Hotline. 30 May.

_ _ _ _ . 1996. NY 02: Battle for open Yucanovich seat is
close. The Hotline. 4 October.

Cook Political Report. 1996. 1996 House races at a glance.
3 J January.

_ _ _ _ . J 996. 1996 House races at a glance. 28 August.

Federal Election Commission. 1996. Financial activity of
House candidates.
http://www.fec.gov/J996/states/nv_OJ.htm. December.

_ _ _ _ . J 996. Selected list of receipts and expenditures:

Gibbons for Congress. 27 October.

_ _ _ _ . 1996. Selected list of receipts and expenditures:
Nevadans for "Spike" Wilson. 27 October.

Fenno, Richard E, Jr. 1978. HomeStyle: House members in
their districts. HarperCollins Publishers.

Gibbons, Christopher. J 996. Endorsements. http://www.gibbons4congress.com/endorse. November.

_ _ _ _ . 1996. Jim's stand on the issues. http://www.gibbons4congress.com/issues.html. November.

_ _ _ _ . J 996. Nevada Appeal-2/28/96. http://www.gibbons4congress.com/nappeal.html. November.

Dayton, Michael, Jim Gibbons' campaign manager. 1996.
Telephone interview by author, 2 November.

Gibbons, James. 1995. Jim Gibbons announces his candidacy.
Reno, Nevada: Campaign Literature.

ElectionLine. J 996. Nevada, 2nd district.
http://www.electionline.com/HTE L/ shoun vO 2 fron t 9 6/ pa
ge J .cgi. September.

_ _ _ _ . J 996. District overview. Reno, Nevada: Campaign
Literature.

46

PI SIGMA ALPHA REVIEW

_ _ _ _ . 1996. Jim Gibbons biography. Reno. Nevada:
Campaign Literature.

Morrison, Jane Ann, and Ed Vogel. 1996. Ensign, Gibbons
defeat challengers. Las Vegas Review-Journal, 6
November, 1 (A) and 5(A).

_ _ _ _ . 1996. Plan to take back our streets. Reno,
Nevada: Campaign Literature.

Nevada Republican Party. 1996. The real story about Spike
Wilson!. Las Vegas, Nevada: Campaign Literature.

_ _ _ _ . 1996. Uncommon courage; Common sense. Reno,
Nevada: Campaign Literature.

Niedowski, Erika. 1996. GOP candidate flew F-4s. The Hill,
28 February.

Gibbons, James, and Patty Cafferata. 1996. Where the candidates stand on the issues of the day. Reno News and
Review, 6 March.

Henley, David C. 1996. Jim Gibbons: Federal government is
too heavy-handed. Lahontan Valley News, 4 January.

Herrnson, Paul S. 1995. Congressional elections:
Campaigning at home and in Washington. Washington,

Paxon, Bill. 1996. FEC complaints mount against Democrats.
Federal Document Clearing House. 2 August.

Tolle, Jeff. 1996. Gibbons cites federal control, crime and tax
as issues. Lovelock Review-Miner, 29 August.

Vogel, Ed. 1996. Gibbons, Wilson, Coffin lead in primaries.
Las Vegas Review-Journal, 4 September, I (B) and 8 (B).

D.C.: CQ Press.
_ _ _ _ . 1996. Gibbons' Iraq stance draws Wilson's fire.
House Information Resources. 1995. Member directory-

Las Vegas Review-Journal, 19 September, 3(B).

Vucanovich.
http://www.house.gov/mbr_dir/NV02.htmI. September.

_ _ _ _ . 1996. Gibbons, Wilson keep TV debate low-key.
Las Vegas Review-Journal, 20 September, 1 (B) and 2 (B).

Kanigher, Steve, and Ken McCall. 1996. Casinos support
Democrat Wilson, not Coffin. Las Vegas Review-Journal
and Las Vegas Sun, 13 October, I (D) and 7(A).

- - - -. 1996. Both Gibbons, Wilson flaunt conservatism.
Las Vegas Review-Journal and Las Vegas Sun, 27 October,
I (A) and 9(A).

Lyon, Steve. 1996. Gibbons has conservative message for 2nd
district. Battle Mountain Bugle, 23 January.

White, Keith. 1995. Vucanovich confirms she will not seek reelection. Gannett News Service, 4 December.

Mayhew, David R. 1974. Congress: The electoral connection.
New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.

Wilson, Thomas. 1996. We like Spike!. Reno, Nevada:
Campaign Literature.

Morrison, Jane Ann. 1996. Jim Gibbons has lead in congressional race. Las Vegas Review-Journal, 12 July, 1 (A) and

3 (A).

HUGH BECK

47

The Illicit Drug Trade
Review by Hugh Beck
LaMond Tullis. 1995. Unintended Consequences: Illegal Drugs
and Drug Policies in Nine Countries. Lynne Rienner

SUGGESTED ApPROACH TO READING UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES

Publishers.

Concerning his choice of theoretical framework,
Tullis states, "The answers [to the questions of the drug
trade 1 insofar as they are possible, are not to be found in any

PURPOSE AND ApPROACH

"Unfortunately, although drug~controllaws have

single discipline, method, theory, frame of reference, or value

contributed little to suppressing the illicit~drug trade, they

preference. Although country~study authors have approached

have contributed much to social dislocations, corruption, mili~

the discussion from their own disciplines-economics, politi~

tarization, abuse of human rights, and a general disregard for

cal science, political economy, history, environmental stud~

human decency" I. Thus goes the principle thesis of

ies-they have tried to be sensitive to the need for cross~dis~

LaMond Tullis's Unintended Consequences: Illegal Drugs and Drug

ciplinary integration" 2. Unintended Consequences thus does not

Policres

In

Nine Countries.

Upon this conclusion Tullis pre~

neatly fall into a single scholarly discipline defined by a unify~

scribes a shift in drug control policies. His volume integrates

ing theoretical base. The reader may therefore initially find it

and interprets the results of nine country~studies completed

difficult to pinpoint the basic assumptions which the volume

by separate scholars respectively qualified for studying the

makes and which influence its conclusions.

nature of drug trade in each of the countries.

classify Unintended Consequences with a group of literature having

Eight of the
pro~

nine countries in which research was conducted are net

Choosing to first

similar characteristics, even if this classification does not suf~

ducers of drugs and thus the geographic focus of the book is

ficiently describe the broad integration of approaches applied

on drug producing countries. The purpose of the volume is

in the studies from which Tullis draws his conclusions, may

four~fold:

thus benefit the reader. The orientation of international

I) to describe and explain what is happening with

the trade of illicit drugs,

2) to describe and assess the

effec~

political economy as such a classification is suggested here,

tiveness of current drug control efforts, 3) to make more

again not so much as a sufficient description of the book's

transparent the unintended socioeconomic and political

actual theoretical base, but more as an aid to the reader in

effects of drug trade and of the efforts to control it, and 4)

grasping the dynamics of the issues Tullis raises and the

to prescribe policy changes that may address the effects seen

nature of the conclusions he reaches.

as most hurtful. In addressing the first three objectives Tullis

Political economy has as its main goal the examina~

draws upon the findings of the studies in each of the nine

tion of governments and markets and how each interacts with

countries. In discussing prescriptions for policy changes he

the other. It seeks to determine the effectiveness of this

focusses specifically on Bolivia and Columbia. These two

interaction in particular cases and also to explore the unin~

countries represent respectively the two basic functional

tended consequences each sphere, in pursuing its own goals,

aspects of the drug trade: production and marketing. Thus,

has upon the other. At times, these consequences may be

conclusions made about Bolivia and Columbia may be applied

favorable but more often they are not. One political economy

to other countries according to the particular mix of produc~

scholar writes, "the market and the government. .. generate

tion and marketing emphasis they exhibit.

powerful forces that reverberate throughout society and
against each other with potentially damaging consequences."3
It is in this sense that Unintended Consequences can be
classified as a political economy study. Tullis's volume seeks to
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examine the effects of a market (the drug market), the effects

level of drug availability. Upon this assumption, policies have

of government intervention into that market, and the unin-

been directed at restricting supply at one of three levels: the

tended consequences of that intervention. Moreover, the drug

production of the drug crop (crop suppression), the traffick-

trade takes place on an international scale, nation-states are

ing network for the drug (network disruption), the movement

affected by drug related activities in neighboring countries, and

of the drug itself (interdiction). The validity of this theory's

as Tullis makes clear any solutions must involve international

principle assumption has been difficult to determine by virtue

cooperation. Unintended Consequences may thus profitably be

of the fact that efforts aimed at restricting supply On one or

seen by the reader as an international political economy study.

on a combination of these three levels have proved largely

Viewing Unintended Consequence as such helps the read-

fruitless. Concerning these efforts Tullis states, "On the

er to realize that the drug trade operates primarily according to

whole the supply-suppression- > consumption reduction model

market principles (the first face of the drug trade) and only

has fallen on hard times. It has too many points to unravel in

secondarily in avoidance of governments' efforts to restrict its

practical application. Usually, where it can unravel, it has

activities (the second face of the drug trade). This distinction

unraveled" 5. Because these efforts' intended consequences (to

allows the reader to grasp the issues Tullis discusses and to see

reduce the effects of the market face of the drug trade) have

that harmful effects of the drug trade occur on both faces.

proved unsuccessful, the only remaining inquiry to be made

This point can be illustrated by a quote from the first chapter

concerning them is of their unintended consequences (the

of Tullis's book: "Were it not for the laws, the production,

effects of the second face of the drug trade, the avoidance of

consumption, and trade of drugs would not be illegal and

restrictions). As the nine country study shows, the unintend-

therefore not criminal. But crimes might still result. Drug-

ed consequences of these efforts have been also been very

related crimes derive from more that simple legislative artifacts

hurtful. Tullts thus prescribes the abandoning of such supply

that parliaments may make and unmake according to their

suppression efforts. In their place he proposes "harm-reduc-

political will. Some addictive drugs have psychopharmacologi-

tion strategies" which focus on reducing drug consumption in

cal properties that may induce violent behavior against chil-

those countries which consume the most and on the initiation

dren, spouses, the unborn, and random bystanders"4. Thus,

of development programs to compensate those countries

some criminal behavior of the drug trade arises upon the first

which would be hurt by such a reorientation.

face of the drug trade (the nature of the drug market itself)
and other criminal behavior arises upon the second face (avoidance of governments' restrictive policies). The distinction is

I .LaMond Tullis. Unintended Consequences: Illegal Drugs and Drug

Policies in Nine Countries. Lynne Rienner Publishers. p. 171.

an important one for Tullis and he keeps it continually at the
forefront of his discussion, especially as he criticizes current
drug efforts and examines possible changes in these efforts.

2 .p.3

We will briefly review these issues next.

Unintended Consequenas helps the reader to understand
the way in which perspectives of the first face of the drug

3.Barry Clark. Pol,tical Economy: A Comparative Approach. Praeger
Publishers. p.6.

trade, specifically of who is most to blame for it, lead to certain types of policies to control drug trade and reactions to

4. p.8

those policies (the second face). Historically most drug control efforts have been based upon what Tullis calls a supply
side theory of addiction. The basic assumption of such a theory is that level of drug consumption is dependent upon the

5. p. I2 6.

JASON BEUTLER

49

Hobbes Early Writings: A Review of Three Discourses
Review by Jason William Beutler
Hobbes, Thomas. 1995. Three Discourses. Reynolds, Noel and

authors, from members of the Cavendish family for whom

Arlene Saxonhouse, eds. Chicago: University of Chicago

Hobbes worked as a tutor to Francis Bacon, one of Hobbes'

Press.

contemporaries. Leo Strauss was the first to suggest that
these essays were written by Hobbes. Marlene Saxonhouse,

Hobbes' seminal work, Leviathan is considered one of

the second editor of this book, wrote a dissertation arguing

the classic books in political philosophy. In the words of

that Strauss was right to attribute Horae Subsecivae to

Richard Peters, "Hobbes' Leviathan ranks as one of the great

Hobbes. Saxonhouse, however, was never able to find a

books in philosophy because it attempted a systematic answer

method of proving this historically. It was not until Noel

to the far-reaching social changes of the sixteenth and seven-

Reynolds showed that word print statistical analysis could be

teenth centuries" (Hobbes 1962, 7).

used to make this case that the "smoking gun" needed to get

Leviathan lays a great

deal of the ground work for liberal ideas about the nationstate's political foundation. Yet many scholars have lamented
the lack of writing available by the young Hobbes. Until

these essays published under Hobbes' name was available.
The third section of the book contains an essay by
Saxon house in which she points out some of the important

recently, the earliest major work available from Hobbes was

insights this early work gives us into Hobbes the political

written when he was already forty years old. Hobbes' early

philosopher. Some scholars have suggested that Hobbes' fas-

work would be useful to scholars who want to understand how

cination with geometry, discovered later in life, led him to

his introduction to the deductive methods of geometry at the

search for origins rather than ends of the state. However,

age of forty affected the questions Hobbes asked and the

these essays make clear that this search for origins began long

methods of argumentation used by Hobbes as a political

before Hobbes discovered geometry at the age of forty. In the

philosopher. The word print work done by Noel Reynolds,

essay entitled, "A Discourse upon the Beginning of Tacitus,"

James Hilton and other professors at Brigham Young

Hobbes examines the work of the Roman historian Tacitus to

University has proved that such a manuscript exists. This

show how Augustus was able to create a stable political foun-

manuscript has recently been published under the tirle of Three

dation. In Saxonhouse's commentary on this essay she notes

DISCourses edited by Noel Reynolds and Arlene Saxonhouse. In

that Hobbes used the example of Augustus to examine the

this review I will explain how this discovery was made and

means necessary to establish political authority in a world

examine some of the important insights this manuscript gives

where divine right to political leadership is no longer accepted

about Hobbes' political philosophy.

as a sufficient gtounds for this authority. Saxonhouse points

The three essays that have recently been released

out that Hobbes is already asking the questions about how

under Hobbes' name were first published anonymously under

political authority is justified and its true origin that he deals

the title Horae Subsecivae in 1620 by Mr. Edward Blount. I

with at greater length in Leviathan.

This London publisher claImed not ro know who had

suggest that Hobbes search for the origins of the state and

authored these discourses, but "having heard them commend-

political authority began long before he discovered geometry.

ed" (Reynolds and Saxonhouse 1995, 27), he asked a friend

Thus these early essays

Hobbes early essays also show that he had already

who had the hand-written copy for permission to print this

broken with ancient philosophers by searching for an origin to

work. This anonymous publication has left scholars debating

state authority separate from God or nature. Machiavelli had

the authorship of these essays for three and half centuries.

already written extensively about the means needed to maintain

These discourses have been attributed to a variety of different

political authority in a godless world by examining Roman his-
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tory in The Prince. In Hobbes' early essays, he follows

analysis and examined some of the insights this new work

Machiavelli's lead in embracing deception and murder of politi-

gives on the development of Hobbes' political philosophy.

cal adversaries by Augustus to establish political order. These

The three essays by the young Hobbes demonstrate that the

acts are justified because political opponents must be put down

questions about the origins of the state and rationale for

before peace can be established. In Hobbes' words, "therefore

political authority are not simply foisted on Hobbes by the

being weary, they could not but be much won with the present

civil wars in England. Rather, these are questions that

ease, and vacancy of War, especially civil war" (44).2 These

Hobbes had long thought about and examined. While the

writings show that Hobbes does not see brutal actions to estab-

deductive methods of geometry helped Hobbes make what

lish political order as a violation of a higher moral code.

many consider to be the one of the greatest arguments ever

Hobbes' willingness to justify any means of securing

for the state, these methods do not lead him to altogether

political authority in a chaotic world shows that he is already

new conclusions about how the state should be founded.

beginning to separate from natural law thinkers who see

Instead, the deductive tools give Hobbes a better way to make

morals and law as a natural by-product of reason possessed by

his arguments. Clearly, the newly identified Hobbesian essays

humans in every situation. Instead he begins an argument

published in Three DIscourses produce interesting insights into

that he carries further in the Leviathan.

Thomas Hobbes the political philosopher and create a new

For Hobbes the real

moral imperative before a stable government forms is self

and interesting way to examine Hobbes' political philosophy.

preservation. In these early essays Hobbes is already prepared
to suggest that laws and morals exist inside a society with a
stable political order, but not outside of this order. Thus he
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fascination with deductive methods of argumentation does
seem to change how Hobbes engages in philosophical arguments in his later works. However, the basic questions that

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . 1962. Leviathan. Michael Oakeshott, ed.
New York: Collier Books.

Hobbes deals with in his early essays are very similar to the
questions he attempts to answer in his seminal work Leviathan.
And even the answers Hobbes gives to these questions
Leviathan coincide with Hobbes' earlier writings. Thus it

seems that while geometry affected Hobbes' method of argu-

Although Horae Subsecivae contained twelve essays, only three
of these have been proven to be written by Hobbes.
2 It is interesting to note that even before Hobbes experi-

mentation about political authority and the origins of the

enced the true ravages of civil war in England, he already

state, Hobbes still reaches a strikingly similar conclusion in

sees it as the greatest evil.

both his early essays published in Horae Subsecivae and hIs later
work Leviathan. Certainly, Hobbes arguments show far greater

refinement in Leviathan than in his early essays, but the need
for strong political authority to establish and maintain the
state never changes.
In this review of Three Discourses I have outlined how
the early writings of Hobbes were identified using word print

ANNA NIBLEY
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Political Parties and the Maintenance of Liberal Democracy
Review by Anna Nibley
Patterson, Kelly D. 1996. Political Pat1ies and tbe Maintenance oj

fashion a definition of democracy. Patterson's definition of

Liberal Democracy. New York: Columbia University

democracy states that "power is limited by the ever-present

Press.

possibility of converting minorities into majorities, which is
exclusive to the electoral sphere" (xix). This area of study

Is democracy failing in the United States? Can its
failures be blamed on the decline of political parties? Has
there actually occurred a decline in political parties in the

emphasizes decisions made in the electoral sphere and the competition that can reverse those decisions in upcoming elections.
To examine the connections between parties and gov-

United States? Kelly Patterson, in his book, Political Parties and

ernance, Patterson compares the policy positions of presiden-

the Maintenance oj Liberal Democracy, sets out to disprove the

tial candidates during the elections of 1952 through 1992 to

notion that the decline in political parties is the reaSOn for

the positions outlined in party platforms and to those of

the "failure" of democracy in the United States.

party leaders in Congress. To accomplish this task, Patterson

Patterson asserts that displeasure with democratic

divides the comparisons into the two different party eras rep-

institutions is not necessarily bad and is in fact a necessary

resented in the eleven elections. The elections of 1952 to

component of workable democracy. Patterson looks at the

1968 are from the period some have labeled the brokered con-

connections between democracy and political parties to prove

vention era. The elections from 1972 to the present represent

the problem with democracy lies not in its institutions but in

the system of popular appeal because of various reforms that

the fact that no one really knows what workable democracy is.

have increased the public participation.

In the end, Patterson rejects the decline-in-party thesis and

Patterson begins his book with a description of

proves democracy is alive and well and only seems ill because

the Republican "revolution" of 1994. He cites this revolu-

it has been misdefined.

tion as evidence of a general dissatisfaction with democracy.

In order to examine political parties and their rela-

Patterson does not attempt to find a panacea for the dis-

tionship to democratic governance, Patterson looks at both

contentment with democracy. He does not try to twist the

the broad party system and the theory of democracy that sus-

definition of democracy so that it could be viewed in a bet-

tains it. Patterson states that any judgment about democra-

ter light; instead, Patterson proves, through quantitative

cy's performance is largely a function of the way in which

means, that this dissatisfaction is actually evidence of the

democracy is defined.

vitality of American democracy. By showing this, Patterson

Essentially, Patterson claims that our

estimations about performance of democracy are largely

accomplishes his goal of proving that democracy is not in

shaped by our definition of democracy and that political par-

decline. Patterson draws in the major theories of today and

ties have a special relationship, for good or ill, with democracy

yesterday to create a workable definition of democracy. His

because they perform a number of visible and latent functions

method is thorough and sound and his sources are carefully

of democracy. He claims further that the performance of

documented.

political parties cannot be evaluated until a workable definition of democracy IS established.
Through the course of the book, Patterson chooses a

Patterson's dialogue is interesting and readable. His
theory, method, and eVIdence shed light on the muddy discussion of political parties and the degree to which their opera-

definition of democracy that points toward the best area in

tion helps to sustain American democracy. Patterson's study

which to study the intersection of democratic theory and polit-

is relevant today because it lends clarity to the question of

ical parties. Patterson looks to Giovanni Sartori's ideas to

democracy and the importance of political parties. Without a
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clear definition of democracy and a coherent discussion of its
relationship to political parties, we end up with a slew of
unproductive efforts to reform what may not need to be
reformed.

